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INTRODUCTION 
In the last several decades, religious organizations have come to occupy an 
enviable legal stature in American society, leading one legal scholar to comment 
that "separation of church and state is no longer the law of the land."J According 
to one analysis, religious organizations received over two hundred exemptions and 
other regulatory benefits in federal legislation over the last eighteen years, covering 
a wide array of areas such as pensions, immigration, and land use.2 One special 
break enacted to prevent religious discrimination in local zoning not only eliminated 
the discrimination, but also provided churches with the ability to discriminate against 
other landowners.3 Beginning with a policy shift in 1996 under President Bill Clinton 
and continuing under President George W. Bush's Faith Based Initiative, religious 
organizations' receipt of state and federal government grants and contracts has steadily 
increased.4 In addition to these more recently bestowed benefits, religious organiza-
tions, including churches, enjoy a longstanding exemption from federal income tax as 
"charitable organizations"5 and are a primary beneficiary of the charitable contributions 
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1 Diana B. Henriques, As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation, N. Y. TIMEs, 
Oct. 8, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Henriques, Exemptions Grow] (quoting John Witte, Jr., 
Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at the Emory University Law School). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 provided churches 
with a greater ability to challenge local zoning decisions in court. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 
Stat. 803 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Professor Marci A. Hamilton, who 
calls for increased consideration of religious exemptions, commented that the Act gave "such 
an expansive remedy that not only are [churches] not getting discriminated against, but they 
are now capable of discriminating against all other landowners." Henriques, Exemptions 
Grow, supra note 1. 
4 Henriques, Exemptions Grow, supra note 1. 
5 See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Is It "Charitable" to Discriminate? The Necessary Trans-
formation of Section 501 (c)( 3) into the Gold Standard for Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REv. 45, 
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deduction.6 In 2006, that deduction alone cost the federal government $40 billion in 
lost revenue and outweighed government expenditures on public lands' preservation, 
environmental protection, and new energy development.? 
In addition to the above benefits, additional exemptions and benefits have been 
proposed in pending congressional legislation. One such bill, the Houses of Worship 
Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005, would amend the Internal Revenue Code (Code) 
to exempt churches and "other houses of worship"g from the political campaign activity 
prohibition in § 501(c)(3).9 The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005 would 
amend the Civil Rights Act of 196410 to require employers "to initiat[e] and engage] 
in an affmnative and bona fide effort, to reasonably accommodate" the religious prac-
tices of employees. 1 1 Another congressional bill would amend the Higher Education 
Act to prevent educational accreditation boards from requiring private religious 
schools to comply with applicable state and local nondiscrimination laws. 12 Most 
recently, religious organizations would be exempt from the prohibition on sexual 
56-60 [hereinafter Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination], for a discussion of the meaning of 
"charitable" under § 501 (c )(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and the common practice of col-
lectively referring to the entities listed in the statute (e.g., religious, educational, scientific, etc.) 
as "charitable." This Article uses the terms "charitable organization," "religious organization," 
and "tax-exempt organization" to refer to nonprofit organizations that qualify for, and have 
been granted, an exemption from federal income tax. See generally 1.R.c. § 50 I (c )(3) (2000) 
(explaining eligibility for these tax benefits). In addition, the terms "exemption" and "tax-
exempt status" refer exclusively to federal income tax law and do not imply exemption under 
other federal tax laws, or under state or local laws, unless otherwise indicated. 
6 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2000); see Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable 
Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REv. 843, 845 (2001) (reporting that religious organi-
zations received sixty percent of all charitable contributions made in 1998, which represented 
the "largest share of any category of charitable organizations, as well as the largest average 
contribution, $1 ,002" (citation omitted)). 
7 Stephanie Strom, Big Gifts, Tax Breaks and a Debate on Charity, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2007, at AI. 
8 Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005 , H.R. 235, l09th Congo (2005); 
see Diana B. Henriques, In the Congressional Hopper: A Long Wish List o/Special Benefits 
and Exemptions, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at A20 [hereinafter Henriques, Long Wish List]; 
see also Religious Freedom Act of 2006, S. 3957, 109th Congo (2006); Diane Freda, Inho/e 
Measure Introduced to Allow Clergy to Speak Out on Political Issues, 189 DAll..Y TAX REp. 
(BNA) G-7 (Sept. 29, 2006). 
9 Unless otherwise indicated, all "Section" references herein are to the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended. 
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000eG) (2000). 
II Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005, H.R. 1445, 109th Congo (2005); see also 
Henriques, Long Wish List, supra note 8. 
i2 See Paul Johnson, Congress Moves to Except Religious Schoolsfrom Gay Rights Laws, 
365GAY.COM, Apr. 18,2006, available at Posting of Bill Howe to NAMEblog, hUp:llnameorg 
.orglpiperrnaillname-mce_nameorg.orgl2006-AprillOOO889.htrnl (Apr. 26, 2006, 11 :02 EDT). 
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orientation discrimination in the workplace under the Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act of 2007.13 
On the state and local levels, religious organizations also typically enjoy lucrative 
real property tax exemptions. 14 For example, in Colorado, religiously owned real prop-
erty valued at more than $1 billion was exempt from local property taxes in 2006. 15 
These exemptions are being extended as religious organizations expand their mission 
to encompass multimedia operations, biblical theme parks, retirement communities, 
child care facilities, fitness centers, bookstores, and coffee shops. 16 Considering these 
expanded missions, the propriety of religious organizations' tax exemption is being 
questioned17 given that these organizations still depend on, and consume, the same 
public services as taxpaying citizens, effectively shifting the cost of providing those 
public services onto those citizens. 18 
The propriety of the extensive tax and other legal exemptions enjoyed by religious 
organizations must further be questioned when they maintain discriminatory policies 
or engage in discriminatory practices. 19 Discrimination can be legally defined as "a 
failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found be-
tween those favored and those not favored. ,,20 Based on that definition, religious orga-
nizations discriminate not only in the employment context, which is legally sanctioned 
in certain circumstances,21 but also in services or activities considered part of their 
religious mission, such as education.22 Many of the discriminatory acts and policies 
involve affiliated schools and universities that (I) terminated employees for questioning 
or violating church doctrine on sexual orientation or marital status, (ii) expelled 
13 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Congo (2007); see 
also H.R. 2015, 110th Congo § 6 (2007) (including gender identity as a protected class); Vote 
On ENDA Delayed as LGBT Pressure Mounts, 365Gay.com, Oct. 1,2007, available at Posting 
of 365GA Y.COM Newscenter Staff to Ray's List, http://rayslistglbtnews.blogspot.comJ2007 
_09_30_archive.html (Oct. 1, 2007, 19:00 EST) (stating support for legislation banning 
discrimination). 
14 See generally Diana B. Henriques, As Religious Programs Expand, Disputes Rise Over 
Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,2006, at Al [hereinafter Henriques, Religious Programs] 
(describing various real property tax breaks for church-held property). 
15 Id. The total forgone property tax revenue on religiously owned real property is not avail-
able, nor is how much of that forgone revenue is shifted to other taxpaying landowners. Id. 
16 Id. Whether these expanded activities are exempt from applicable property taxes typically 
depends on the state's definition or concept of "charity." Id. 
17 See id. (describing discontentment in communities about some charitable tax deductions). 
18 Henriques, Exemptions Grow, supra note 1. The total national cost of providing such 
public services is not readily known. Id. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 24-40 (discussing various discriminatory practices 
of religious organizations). 
20 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (8th ed. 2004). 
21 See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. 
22 See Henriques, Religious Programs, supra note 14. 
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students for their alleged or announced gay sexual orientation, or (iii) maintained 
employment and admissions standards that discriminated on the basis of sexual orien-
tation or marital statuS.23 Consider some additional recent examples: 
1. Massachusetts Roman Catholic bishops requested that Catholic Charities and 
Catholic social service agencies be granted an exemption from the state's anti-discrim-
ination law that permits gay and lesbian individuals to adopt children.24 The four 
Roman Catholic bishops in the state asserted that the law violated their constitutionally 
granted religious freedom.2S Eight members of the Catholic Charities board eventually 
resigned in protest of the bishops' position.26 The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
San Francisco has similarly made statements that its Catholic Charities agency "will 
no longer allow same-sex couples to adopt children," threatening its receipt of $5.8 
million in state and local government funding.27 
2. A Jewish university withdrew financial support for the student club, Gay-
Straight Alliance, and barred the organization from using the university's name.28 A 
university officer stated that gay lifestyle did not comport with "observant Judaism" 
and the university's values.29 Similarly, a Roman Catholic-affiliated medical college 
opposed recognition of a gay and lesbian club because it would "'advocate and pro-
mote activities inconsistent with the values of the college.' ,,30 
3. A physician filed suit against his employer, a Roman Catholic-affiliated 
hospital, for its refusal to grant his life partner coverage under its employee health 
insurance policy.3) The physician and the hospital maintain conflicting viewpoints on 
the applicability of Connecticut's civil union statute to the dispute.32 The hospital 
defends its decision as complying with the Roman Catholic Church's "'teachings, 
principals [sic] and ethical directives.",33 
23 See Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 48-50. 
24 See Uproar In Boston Over Gay Adoptions, CBS NEWS, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www 
.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/02lnationallmain 1361889 .shtml ?source=search_story; see also 
Jonathan Saltzman, Romney Eyes Bill Exempting Religious Groups on Bias Laws, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 11,2006, at A4. 
25 Boston Archdiocese Stops Adoption Work, CBS NEWS, Mar. 11, 2006, http://www 
.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/111nationallmain 1391621.shtml ?source=search_story. 
26 Id. 
27 Wyatt Buchanan, Archdiocese Halts Same-Sex Adoptions at Catholic Charities; 
Spokesman Points to Stance Taken by New Archbishop, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 21, 2006, at B2. 
28 See Chris G. Denina, Gay Club Loses Touro OK, V AUEJO TIMES HERAID (Cal.), 
Sept. 29, 2006, at At. 
29 Id. 
30 Andy Newman, Westchester Not Examining Barring o/Gay Student Club, N. Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 2005, at B4 (quoting statement from New York Medical College). 
31 Michael Puffer, Gay Complaint May Pit State Against Church, WATERBURY 
REpUBUCAN-AM. (Conn.), Feb. 5, 2006, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/ 
f-news/1572459/posts. 
32 See id. (stating that the couple believed the hospital was compelled to cover the couple 
because Connecticut recognized civil unions). 
33 Id. (quoting Robert Ritz, President and CEO of Saint Mary's Hospital). 
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4. An evangelical Christian-owned university that encouraged a part-time 
professor to apply for a full-time position allegedly rejected her for being openly 
gay.34 The university's president explained that the university only hired Christians 
who observed the church's principles, one of which stated that only heterosexuals 
should marry and have sexual relations. 35 
5. A Roman Catholic all-girls secondary school compelled two lesbian employees 
to resign or be fired after they distributed invitations to their commitment ceremony.36 
6. A full professor resigned from a non-denominational evangelical Protestant 
college rather than conform to the college's longstanding policy on divorced employ-
ees.37 Under that policy, the professor would have been required to discuss the terms 
of his divorce with the college to determine whether his marital dissolution fell within 
what the college deemed to be acceptable biblical parameters.38 
7. A Roman Catholic-affiliated university rejected adding sexual orientation to 
its stated nondiscrimination policy that applied to the hiring and promotion of fac-
Ulty and staff as well as student admissions. 39 A statement issued by the university's 
trustees explained that the inclusion of sexual orientation in its policy could restrain its 
ability to '''make decisions that are necessary to support Catholic church teaching.,,>40 
The paramount issue raised by these examples of discrimination is continued 
federal governmental sUpport41 of the religious organizations via tax-exempt status 
34 See Angela Rozas, North Park Sued; Sex Bias Charged; Gay Professor Accuses College, 
Cm. TRm., Dec. 4, 2003, at C2. 
35 [d.; North Park Accused of Discrimination, CHI. TRm., Dec. 4, 2003, at 6. 
36 Manuela Da Costa-Fernandes, Lesbians' Firing Fuels Outrage, NEW HAVEN REG., 
July 2, 2002, available at http://www.nhregister.com/articlesl2002/07/02/importl4619710.txt. 
37 Elizabeth Redden, Divorce: Grounds/or Dismissal, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Apr. 25, 2008. 
38 [d. 
39 Chuck Colbert, Notre Dame Blew /ton Discrimination Policy, NAT'LCATHOucREp., 
Mar. 26, 1999, available at http://natcath.orglNCR_Online/archives211999a1032699/032699k 
.htm. In contrast, the anti-discrimination policy of Saint Louis University, a Catholic Jesuit 
university specifically states: "Based on our Catholic values and tradition we are committed 
to protecting the dignity of each person and therefore extend our nondiscrimination policy 
to include sexual orientation." Saint Louis University Antidiscrimination Policy, available at 
http://www.slu.edulorganizations/rainbow/slu_policy.htrnl. Similarly, Boston College, also 
a Catholic Jesuit university, provides that it is the policy of the college 
to comply with all state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination in 
employment and in its educational programs on the basis of a person's 
race, religion, color, national origin, age [sic] sex, marital or parental 
status, veteran status, or disability, and to comply with state law pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of a person's sexual orientation. 
Notice of Nondiscrimination, Boston College Office for Institutional Diversity, available at 
http://www.bc.eduloffices/diversity/compliancelnondiscrim.htrnl (last visited Nov. 23, 2008). 
40 Colbert, supra note 39 (quoting statement of Notre Dame trustees). 
41 For further discussion on the equivalence of tax exemption and the charitable con-
tributions deduction to "subsidies" or direct government grants of money, see Mirkay, 
Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 79-82; see also David A. Brennen, Tax 
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and a charitable contributions deduction for their donors.42 Current federal income 
tax law does not explicitly prohibit discrimination by religious organizations.43 "The 
only possible restraint on discrimination exists in the public-policy doctrine enun-
ciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States, which 
granted the Treasury Department (and the IRS by delegation) the power to revoke the 
tax-exempt status of an organization whose purpose violates 'established public 
policy. ,,,44 However, the IRS has used the doctrine to revoke tax-exempt status only 
in instances where the "organizations ... participated in racial discrimination, advo-
cated civil disobedience, or involved themselves in an illegal activity.,,45 Despite its 
merits, the doctrine's main failure is its lack of a clearly defined source of "established 
public policy.,,46 For instance, based on examples of discrimination provided herein, 
does discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status violate an estab-
lished public policyr7 Legal scholars differ in their conclusions.48 Furthermore, 
Expenditures, Social Justice, and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to 
Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 BYUL. REv. 167, 173,208-25 [hereinafter Brennen, 
Tax Expenditures ] (discussing both the legal effects of economic equivalence and the consti-
tutional equiValence tax expenditure theories). 
42 Religious organizations are typically exempt from federal income taxation pursuant 
to § 501(c)(3).I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). As eligible organizations described in § 170(c)(2), 
religious organizations may receive tax-deductible charitable contributions pursuant to § 170(a). 
1.R.c. § 170(a), (c)(2)(B) (2000). 
43 See Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 51; see also Brennen, Tax 
Expenditures, supra note 41, at 169. 
44 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 51 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983)). 
45 [d.; see also David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, 
Public Policy, and "Charity" in Contemporary Society, 33 U.c. DAVISL. REv. 389, 391 n.2 
(2000) [hereinafter Brennen, Racial Discrimination] (citing Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 c.B. 
204; Rev. Rul. 71-447,1971-2 C.B. 230; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2,1991)). 
46 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at51, 67; see also Brennen, Racial 
Discrimination, supra note 45, at 403-04,407,439 (describing the problems surrounding 
defining "established public policy"). 
47 See Mirkay, Charities and Discrimination, supra note 5, at 51 (asking if this policy 
extends to include sexual orientation or marital status). 
48 [d.; see also Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 
A.2d 1,38-39 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Georgetown University violated a District 
of Columbia law prohibiting an educational institution from discriminating against an indi-
vidual on the basis of sexual orientation, and concluding that the "eradication of sexual orien-
tation discrimination is a compelling governmental interest"); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW 
OFT AX-EXEMPTORGANlZATIONS § 6.2(d) (9th ed. 2007) (''It may also be quite validly asserted 
that there is a federal public policy, either presently in existence or in the process of develop-
ment, against other forms of discrimination, such as discrimination on the basis of marital 
status, national origin, religion, handicap, sexual preference, and age." (citation omitted)). 
But cj. Michael Hatfield et al., Bob Jones University: Defining Violations of Fundamental 
Public Policy, in 6 TOPICS IN PHll.AN1HRopy 1, 86-87 (2000), available at http://wwwl.1aw 
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critics routinely comment that the public policy doctrine places too much discretion 
in a regulatory agency.49 
In a prior article, I proposed a solution to the problem of discrimination by chari-
table organizations (a term commonly interpreted to include religious organizations)5O-
enact a broad and well-defined nondiscrimination requirement in § 501 (c )(3).51 This 
nondiscrimination provision would be based on currently existing language in the fed-
eral civil rights laws, but "expanded to include the bases on which charitable organiza-
tions most commonly discriminate": sexual orientation and marital statuS.52 "Inherent 
in this proposal is the notion that any discrimination by a charitable organization is 
intrinsically incompatible with that organization's charitable purpose and mission. ,,53 
The inclusion of a nondiscrimination requirement directly in the statute that grants tax-
exempt status sends a strong and symbolic message to potential and existing charitable 
organizations that discriminatory policies and practices are intrinsically inconsistent 
.nyu.edulncpl/library/publications/Monograph2000BobJones.pdf (concluding that there is 
no "fundamental national public policy against sexual orientation discrimination"). 
49 See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 186-87; Brennen, Racial Discrim-
ination, supra note 45, at 411-28,446; Charles O. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax Policy 
Analysis o/Bob Jones Universityv. United States, 36 V AND. L.REv. 1353, 1372-73 (1983). 
50 See Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5. The Supreme Court's decision in 
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), solidified the view that a common 
law "charitable" overlay to all exempt organizations described in § 501(c)(3) existed.ld. at 
585-86. It noted that in order to qualify for exempt status thereunder, an organization must 
(1) fall within one ofthe eight categories set forth in the statute, and (2) demonstrate that its 
activities are not contrary to established public policy.ld. at 585. In rejecting the university's 
argument that the eight categories in § 501(c)(3) are disjunctive and, therefore, that an organi-
zation need not also qualify as "charitable" to be tax-exempt, the Court explained that Congress 
intended that "entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards 
of charity-namely, that an institution ... must serve a public purpose and not be contrary 
to established public policy." ld. at 586; see also John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption o/Church 
Property: HistoricalAnomalyor Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L.REv. 363, 376 
n.49 (1991) (discussing the historical evolution and eventual inclusion of "religious use" of 
property into "charitable use"); cf Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints On Charitable 
Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REv. 291, 292 (1984) (arguing the debate should be narrowed to 
consider policy considerations of §§ 50l(c)(3) and 170, not the policy as a whole). 
51 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 52, 84. For recent examples of 
discrimination by charitable and religious organizations, see supra notes 2~3 and accom-
panying text, and Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 48-50. 
52 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 84. Any statutorily imposed 
nondiscrimination requirement should address the intended meaning of"discrirnination" with 
respect to discriminatory organizations that otherwise operate exclusively for exempt purposes 
under § 50l(c)(3). /d. at 103-04 ("Ultimately, whether or not a particular policy or action 
constitutes discrimination would depend on a facts-and-circumstances determination, with 
standards and burdens of proof borrowed from established civil-rights laws and other nondis-
crimination statutes."). 
53 ld. at 84. 
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with tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).54 More precisely, "nondiscriminatory prac-
tices and policies comport with the commonly accepted notion of being 'charitable' 
and conferring public benefit. ,,55 Although an organization that discriminates would 
lose its § 501(c)(3) tax exemption under the proposal, it may still qualify for tax ex-
emption under § 501(c)(4) as a "social welfare organization.,,56 However, social wel-
fare organizations do not qualify for the § 170 charitable contributions deduction,57 
thereby preventing offending organizations from using tax -deductible donations that 
they receive to discriminate against members of society.58 
Nevertheless, applying a nondiscrimination requirement to religious organizations 
is perplexing because federal income tax law does not defme "religious" or "religion" 
due primarily to First Amendment concerns. 59 Because the IRS is acutely aware of the 
constitutional minefield surrounding any attempt to define "religion" or "religious," 
or "church," it therefore opts for a broad interpretation.60 For federal income tax law 
purposes, religious organizations are generally defmed more broadly than "churches" 
or "houses of worship," and can include schools and universities, social service agen-
cies, publishers, broadcasters, and cemeteries.61 However, with respect to churches, 
some designation is necessary because of the unique treatment and protection the 
Code accords to "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associa-
tions of churches."62 As proposed in my prior article, churches should be excepted 
54 [d. at 84-85. 
55 [d. at 85. 
56 [d. at 88; see, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash. , 461 U.S. 540, 544 
(1983) (discussing the availability of tax exemption as a social welfare organization); Branch 
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing the Church's ability to 
form a related organization under 501 (c)(4». Section 501 (c)(4) grants tax-exempt status to 
[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated 
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of 
employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a 
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net 
earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or 
recreational purposes. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2000). 
57 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 88; see I.R.C. § 170(a)(I), 
(c)(IH2) (2000). 
58 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 88. 
59 See HOPKINS, supra note 48, § to.2(a) (reviewing various Supreme Court and state court 
language grappling with defining religion). 
60 JAMES J. FIsHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROm ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 444 (3d ed. 2006); see also HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10.3 (stating the IRS has 
resisted publishing criteria for what constitutes a church). 
61 FIsHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 60, at 445. 
62 1.R.c. § 508( c)( I )(A) (2000); see also 1.R.c. § 508(b ) (exempting churches from notice 
rules governing other exempt organizations); I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(iii) (exempting religious 
orders from filing certain annual returns); I.R.C. § 7611 (restricting auditing of churches); 
2009] LOSING OUR RELIGION 723 
from the nondiscrimination requirement due to First Amendment concerns.63 This 
raises the issue of how narrowly the federal income tax defInition of a "church" should 
be drawn, taking into consideration that schools, universities, and social service agen-
cies may presently be component parts of a church or qualify as "integrated auxilia-
ries" and, thus, treated as churches under the Code.64 Although my prior article briefly 
addressed the difficulty of applying a nondiscrimination requirement to religious orga-
nizations, it acknowledged the necessity of additional and more thorough discussion 
on the issue;65 thus, the focus of this Article. 
Accordingly, this Article examines the propriety and constitutionality of subject-
ing religious organizations to a § 501 (c )(3) nondiscrimination requirement and crafting 
a more narrow church exception to that requirement. This Article ultimately proposes 
modifIcation of the current statutory and regulatory exemption scheme for religious 
organizations to effect a more narrowly drawn federal income tax defInition of a 
church. Part I of this Article provides a statutory and regulatory framework for the 
proposal. Part II briefly reviews other noteworthy proposals with respect to combating 
discrimination, such as expansion of the public-policy doctrine and broader applica-
bility of civil rights laws, and concludes that both fail in the context of sexual orien-
tation and marital status discrimination. It further offers a potential solution in the 
form of statutory and regulatory amendments that would narrow the eligibility of 
integrated auxiliary status and, thus, limit the availability of church tax benefIts to 
affiliated organizations. Part ill attempts to tackle the seemingly enormous, yet pre-
carious, constitutional issues inherent in the proposal; namely, First Amendment free 
speech, establishment, and free exercise concerns. 
I. THE EVOLVING TAXONOMY OF "RELIGIOUS" AND "CHURCH" 
A. Overview of the Federal Income Tax Exemption66 
In order to discuss the incongruity of deeming a discriminatory organization 
"religious," it is necessary to understand the exemption statute and the regulatory 
tests that must be satisfIed before the IRS grants an exemption. Section 501 (c )(3) 
provides for the federal income tax exemption of nonprofIt corporations and certain 
other entities 
infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. 
63 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 100. The article further proposed 
extending the exception to religious orders and similar exclusively religious organizations 
exempt under § 50l(c)(3). Id. at 100 n.325. 
64 Id. at 98-100. 
65 Id. at 88 (discussing the difficulties of applying a nondiscrimination requirement to 
religious organizations). 
66 The discussion in this subpart is substantially similar to a corresponding discussion con-
tained in Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 54-56. 
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organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, . . . or educational purposes, . . . no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which 
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation ... and which does not participate in, or intervene in 
... any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office.67 
The principal benefit of a § 501(c)(3) exemption is that the exempt organization is 
entitled to receive charitable contributions that are tax-deductible to its donors under 
§ 170(a)(l).68 For the most part, only organizations exempt under § 501(c)(3) are eli-
gible for this valuable benefit. 69 In addition, organizations exempt under § 501 (c )(3) 
are also eligible to issue bonds, subject to certain limitations, the interest on which 
is not included in the bondholder's income.7o 
IRS regulations and rulings define the meaning of each of the eight specific 
exempt purposes listed in the statute (for example, religious, charitable,71 and edu-
cational).72 Section 501(c)(3) establishes both an organizational test and an opera-
tional test for determining whether an organization fulfills its exempt purposes;73 to 
qualify for exemption, an organization must meet both tests.74 The organizational 
67 I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (2000). Specifically, § 50l(a) provides that "[a]n organization 
described in subsection (c) or (d) ... shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle .... " 
[d. § 50l(a). 
68 [d. § 170(a)(1) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution ... 
payment of which is made within the taxable year."). Donors must primarily make contri-
butions to either governmental entities or charitable organizations under § 501 (c )(3). See id. 
§ 170(c)(1)-(2). 
69 Certain veterans' organizations, fraternal organizations, and cemetery organizations, 
which are exempt from federal income tax under other subsections of § 50l(c), are also entitled 
to receive tax-deductible contributions. See id. § 170(c)(3H5). 
70 See id. §§ 103(a), 141, 145-49. 
71 See supra note 50; see also Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5 (discussing 
the meaning of "charitable" under § 501 (c )(3) and the common practice of collectively referring 
to the entities listed in the statute as "charitable"). In addition, the IRS has detennined that other 
qualifying purposes meet the overall public-benefit principle of § 501(c)(3) based on an ex-
pansive interpretation of "charitable." See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 178. 
72 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d) (as amended in 2008) (categorizing the exemptions as: 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, or prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals). Section 501 (c )(3) lists as an eighth exempt purpose "to foster 
national or international amateur sports competition," which is not addressed by any regulation. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
73 1.R.e. § 50l(c)(3). 
74 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(a)(I) (as amended in 2008). 
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test relates solely to the language used in the organization's governing documents.75 
An organization meets the requirements of the test if it was organized exclusively for 
at least one tax-exempt, charitable purpose.76 This is possible only if the organizing 
document (1) limits the organization's purpose to one or more exempt purposes, and 
(2) does not expressly empower it to substantially engage in activities that do not fur-
ther any exempt purposes.77 The organizational test also imposes requirements on the 
distribution of the organization's assets upon dissolution.78 
The purpose of the operational test is to ensure that an exempt organization's re-
sources and activities are devoted primarily to its exempt purposes. The regulations 
break down the operational test into two components: (1) the primary-purpose-or-
activity test and (2) the private-inurement prohibition.79 Under the primary-purpose-
or-activity test, "[a]n organization will be regarded.as operated exclusively for one 
or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish 
one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).,,80 An organi-
zation will not pass this test if "more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not 
in furtherance of an exempt purpose.,,81 
Under the private-inurement prohibition, an organization will not satisfy the 
operational test "if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private 
shareholders or individuals.,,82 The regulations define the term "private shareholder 
or individual" as "persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of 
the organization,,,83 such as officers, directors, or other individuals in a position to 
assert influence or control over the organization's operations and activities.84 The 
prohibition is absolute-any amount of inurement is impermissible.85 Organizations 
exempt under § 50 I (c )(3) are also subject to other statutory and regulatory standards 
with respect to their operations, including the private-benefit doctrine.86 
75 See id. § 1.S01(c)(3)-I(b)(I)(i). 
76 See id. § 1.S01(c)(3)-I(a)(I). 
77 Id. § 1.S01(c)(3)-I(b)(I)(i). 
78 See id. § 1.S01 (c )(3)-1 (b)( 4). The IRS typically implements this regulation by requiring 
an organization, either in its governing document or under relevant state law, to explicitly 
dedicate its assets to one or more exempt purposes in the event of dissolution. Id. 
79 See id. § 1.S01(c)(3)-I(c)(I) & (2). 
80 Id. § 1.S01(c)(3)-I(c)(I). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. § 1.S01(c)(3)-I(c)(2). 
83 Id. § 1.S01 (a)-1 (c); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991) ("The 
proscription against inurement generally applies to ... persons who, because of their particular 
relationship with an organization, have an opportunity to control or influence its activities."). 
84 See HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 20.3. 
85 See Treas. Reg. § 1.S01(c)(3)-I(c)(2) (as amended in 2008). 
86 See id. § 1.S0 1 (c )(3)-1 (d)(1 )(ii). For further discussion of the private-benefit doctrine 
and other operational restrictions, see Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS 
Should Change Its Stance on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 
21,30-34,62 (200S). 
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As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court's Bob Jones University decision 
imposes the additional, nonstatutory public-policy doctrine on an organization seeking 
tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).87 By failing to articulate a clearly defined source 
of "established public policy,,,88 courts have left the doctrine open to the IRS's un-
fettered discretion,89 potentially allowing discrimination to flourish in areas other than 
race, civil disobedience, and illegality. 
B. "Religious" Organization and "Church" under Federal Income Tax Law 
1. Definition of "Religious" and "Church,,90 
To allay any constitutional concerns, religious organizations are generally defmed 
broadly to include a variety of other organizations in addition to churches or traditional 
houses of worship.91 The IRS is acutely aware of the constitutional ramifications of 
attempting to defme "religion" or "religious" narrowly, and has advised its agents to 
interpret the terms broadly to encompass "even those sects that do not believe in a 
Supreme Being.,,92 Accordingly, the IRS has subscribed to this general rule: "in the 
absence of a clear showing that the beliefs or doctrines under consideration are not 
sincerely held by those professing or claiming them as a religion, the Service cannot 
question the 'religious' nature of those beliefs. ,,93 The IRS concluded that this rule 
comports with the Establishment Clause: "An attempt to define religion, even for pur-
poses of statutory construction, violates the 'establishment' clause since it necessarily 
delineates and, therefore,limits what can and cannot be a religion.,,94 In fact, the IRS 
has typically denied religious organization exemptions only on other grounds, such 
as the private-inurement prohibition95 or the restrictions on lobbying and political 
campaign activities under § 501(c)(3).96 
87 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 (1983). 
88 [d. at 586. 
89 See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 178 n.48. 
90 Portions of the discussion in this subpart are substantially similar to a corresponding 
discussion contained in Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 95-99. 
91 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
92 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 60, at 445; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 
(Feb. 3, 1977) (finding that a witches' coven qualified as a church under § 501(c)(3)). 
93 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977); see also Holy Spirit Ass'n for the 
Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 435 N.E.2d 662, 668 (N.Y. 1982) ("It is 
for religious bodies themselves, rather than the courts or administrative agencies, to define, 
by their teachings and activities, what their religion is. The courts are obliged to accept such 
characterization ... unless it is found to be insincere or [a] sham."). 
94 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3,1977). 
95 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. 
96 See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (addressing a 
church's political campaign prohibition violation); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. 
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Even though it cannot question or regulate religious belief and opinions, Congress 
can regulate religious action and practices.97 In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme 
Court upheld a federal law criminalizing the practice of polygamy.98 In holding that 
citizens were not excepted from the statute because of their religious beliefs, the Court 
explained that a law may impede religious practices, but not religious beliefs or opin-
ions.99 In a subsequent case involving a state statute that regulated solicitation by 
charitable organizations, the Court elaborated on Reynolds by stating that "the [First] 
Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The 
ftrst is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains 
subject to regulation for the protection of society."loo 
Although the same congressional and IRS trepidation with respect to religious 
belief is present in attempting to deftne a "church,,,101 some designation is necessary 
because of the unique treatment and protection that churches receive under the 
Code.102 As one court astutely observed, ''To exempt churches, one must know what 
a church is.,,103 In making these designations, the IRS follows a ftfteen-item check-
lise04 -including a distinct legal existence, a recognized creed and form of worship, 
United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973) (involving the 
revocation of an organization's exempt status because it failed to meet the operational test and 
violated lobbying and political campaign restrictions); Unitary Mission Church of Long Island 
v. Comm'r, 74 T.e. 507 (1980), affd, 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding the denial of a 
church's exemption because of the private benefit and inurement to the organization's control-
ling members); see also United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444 (D.D.C. 1968) (determin-
ing that the organization at issue was not "religious" because it was clearly motivated by the 
"desire to use drugs and to enjoy drugs for their own sake"). 
97 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 60, at 453. 
98 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
99 ld. at 166. 
100 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). At issue in the case was a state 
statute that prohibited the solicitation of contributions by religious, charitable, or philanthropic 
causes without obtaining official approval.ld. at 301-.02. The Court ultimately concluded that 
such approval constituted an invalid prior constraint on the free exercise of religion.ld. at 307. 
101 HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10.3. 
102 See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text. 
103 De LaSalle Inst. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891,903 (N.D. Cal. 1961). The court's 
full observation states that: "Congress must either define 'church' or leave the definition to 
the common meaning and usage of the word; otherwise, Congress would be unable to exempt 
churches." ld. 
104 ROBERT LoUTHIAN & THOMAS Mn..LER, I.R.S., DEFINING "CHuRCH"-THE CONCEPT 
OF A CONGREGATION 2 (1993), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopica94.pdf. The fifteen 
points are as follows: 
(a) a distinct legal existence, (b) a recognized creed and form of worship, 
(c) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government, (d) a formal code of 
doctrine and discipline, (e) a distinct religious history, (f) a membership 
not associated with any other church or denomination, (g) an organization 
of ordained ministers, (h) ordained ministers selected after completing 
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a fonnal code of doctrine and discipline, a distinct religious history, and the selection 
of ordained ministers after prescribed studies. lo5 Although the IRS has cautioned that 
these criteria are not exclusive and that it ultimately uses a facts-and-circumstances 
determination,l06 the criterion that courts most consistently rely on in determining the 
existence of a church is the presence or absence of an established and regular con-
gregation. I07 Specifically, the focus is on a coherent and dynamic membership with 
shared religious purposes and beliefs. lOS The size of the congregation is not determi-
native. 109 Because charitable organizations must primarily confer public benefit, the 
congregational or associational facet of a church comports with that requirement. 110 
Although nearly all religious organizations are eligible for a tax exemption under 
§ 501(c)(3), only "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associa-
tions of churches" are presumed not to be private foundations, III and thus, excepted 
from the notice requirements of § 508.112 That is, a church does not need to file an 
application for the IRS to recognize it as exempt under § 501(c)(3).113 Churches are 
also relieved of filing annual infonnation returns with the IRS.1I4 In addition, the 
Code confers upon churches special procedural safeguards with respect to IRS 
prescribed studies, (I) a literature of its own, G) established places of wor-
ship, (k) regular congregations, (1) regular religious services, (m) Sunday 
schools for religious instruction of the young, (n) schools for the prepa-
ration of its ministers, and (0) any other facts and circumstances that may 
bear upon the organization's claim for church status. 
Id. In instructing that the criteria "are not exclusive and are not to be mechanically applied," 
the IRS Chief Counsel recommended the addition of the fifteenth criterion. See I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 38,982 (May 3,1983). Federal courts adopted the original fourteen-point test 
inAm. Guidance Found., Inc. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 304, 306 n.2 (D.D.C. 1980) (not 
including the residual, "facts and circumstances" factor). 
105 LoUTHIAN & MILLER, supra note 104. 
106 Id. 
107 /d. at 3("At a minimum, a church includes a body of believers or communicants that 
assembles regularly in order to worship." (quoting Am. Guidance Found., 490 F. Supp. at 306». 
108 LoUTHIAN & MILLER, supra note 104, at 8. 
109 See id. 
110 Wendy Gerzog Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. Pm. L. REv. 
345,351,353 n.52; see also Charles M. Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: 
The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 926 ( 1977) (discussing the centrality 
of the congregational model to the I.R.S.'s conception of a "church"). 
111 I.R.C. § 508(b), (c)(I)(A) (2000). See infra note 148 for an explanation of private 
foundation versus public charity status under § 509. 
112 See id. § 508(c)(I). 
113 See id. § 508(c)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(3)(i)(a) (as amended in 1995). 
114 See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(I) (2000). However, churches are required to file a Form 
990-T, Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return, reporting any income that is subject 
to the unrelated business income tax imposed by § 511 (a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.60 12-2( e) 
(as amended in 2007). 
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examinations or audits. 115 Moreover, among other exemptions, churches are exempted 
from certain rules governing qualified retirement plans, and social security, self-
employment, and withholding taxes. 116 
As illustrated below, churches have varying and multifaceted structures, and their 
activities typically comprise more than just providing religious services and worship 
to their congregants. Many churches also operate schools, seminaries, or social-service 
agencies. The manner in which the church operates these other activities-within 
or without a separate legal entity-raises potential tax exemption issues. ll7 Until a 
church places an activity in a separate legal entity, the IRS generally considers it to be 
a part of the church and therefore covered by the church's exemption.118 Once the 
church forms a new legal entity to conduct an activity, the entity must obtain its own 
tax -exempt statuS. 119 Due to the entity's relationship to the church, the Code typi-
cally classifies it as an "integrated auxiliary," which accords the entity church-like 
treatment. 120 The statutory requirements and significance of being categorized as an 
integrated auxiliary are discussed in greater detail in the following subparts. 
2. Historical Overview of the Distinction 
The history of the Code's distinction between churches and religious organiza-
tions is particularly relevant to this Article. Primarily, it exposes Congress's choice 
to treat churches differently from other religious organizations, and how that special 
treatment was extended to integrated auxiliaries or affiliates of churches, such as 
educational institutions. As this discussion reveals, this extension of church-like 
treatment directly impacts the applicability of a nondiscrimination requirement to 
these church affiliates. 
The tax exemption of religious organizations-specifically, churches-is deep-
rooted in American history. 121 Beginning in 1798, Congress recognized the propriety 
115 See I.R.C. § 7611 (2000). Section 7611 (h)(1) defines church as "any organization claim-
ing to be a church" and "any convention or association of churches." [d. 
116 NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI& JACLYNFABEAN CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT AND 
TAXEXEMPTORGANIZATIONS§ 8.03[C] (2006) (citingl.R.C. §§ 410(c)(I)(B),411(e)(1)(B), 
412(h)(4), 414(e), 1402(e), 3121(b)(8), 3401(a)(9»; see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 
887-89 & nn.II-25 (listing fifteen basic religious distinctions recognized by the Internal 
Revenue Code). 
117 CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 116, § 8.06. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. 
120 [d. 
121 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970); see JOHND.COLOMBO 
& MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 226 (1995) ("[T]he core rationale for 
religious exemption has seldom been questioned."); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Exemption 
of Religious Organizations from Federal Taxation, in REUGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 409,411 (JamesA. Serritella et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Gaffney, Federal 
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of, and adopted for federal tax purposes, the states' exemptions of churches from real 
estate tax and other direct taxes. 122 Since the Sixteenth Amendment's enactment, reli-
gious organizations have been continuously exempted from federal income tax. 123 
In 1917, Congress further extended religious organizations' federal tax benefits by 
enacting a deduction for contributions made to "corporations or associations orga-
nized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational 
purposes."I24 Although churches are considered to be religious organizations, the 
opposite is not generally correct. 125 
The statutory distinction between churches and religious organizations primarily 
began with the enactment of the unrelated business income tax in 1950.126 By specif-
ically excepting "a church, a convention or association of churches" from the new 
tax,127 Congress acknowledged the difference between churches (religious organiza-
tions that maintain "exclusively religious activities") and church-affiliated entities 
("religious organizations that carry on charitable, literary, or educational activities"). 128 
As a consequence, church-related charitable and educational entities, such as colleges 
and universities, social service agencies, and hospitals, appeared to be subject to the 
new tax. 129 Because of the varying and multifaceted structure of American churches, 
however, the IRS experienced great difficulty in implementing this distinction. 13o 
As explained by one legal scholar, American churches are generally either "congre-
gational" or "hierarchical" in their configuration: 
In the congregational churches, the faith and internal reli-
gious law of the denominations make each local congregation 
Taxation] (''The U.S. federal government and all fifty states maintain a system of general ex-
emption of religion from the payment of most forms of taxation. This widespread American 
practice is not a recent invention; on the contrary, it is rooted deeply in the principle of religious 
freedom, a value at the very core of the American constitutional order."). 
122 Walz, 397 U.S. at 677-78 & n.5; see also Daniel M. Andersen, Political Silence at 
Church: The Empty Threat of Removing Tax-Exempt Status for Insubstantial Attempts to 
Influence Legislation, 2006 BYU L. REv. 115, 122 ("[B]y traditional default, churches are 
generally not part of the federal tax base."). 
123 Walz, 397 U.S. at 676 n.4. 
124 War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2),40 Stat. 300, 330; see also Aprill, supra 
note 6, at 848. 
125 Shaller, supra note 110, at 350. 
126 Whelan, supra note 110, at 901. 
127 Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 421(b)(1), 64 Stat. 948, 948; see also Whelan, supra 
note 110, at 902. The exception was eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 
91-172, 83 Stat. 536 (codified at I.R.C. § 511). 
128 Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax 
Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REv. 71, 82 (1991). 
129 Whelan. supra note 110, at 902-03. 
130 Id. at 903. 
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autonomous. The coordination of the various congregations' 
activities is a matter of voluntary agreement or "covenant." Each 
local congregation is usually a separate civil law corporation or 
trust. . . . Thus there is no Baptist Church; there are only Baptist 
churches and Baptist conventions or associations of churches .... 
In the hierarchical churches, such as the Roman Catholic, Pres-
byterian, Eastern Orthodox, and Mormon denominations, the 
faith and internal religious law create a single church authority 
with jurisdiction over all the members and branches of the church. 
Local congregations are divisions, not autonomous units. Thus 
it is entirely proper to speak: of the "Roman Catholic Church" or 
the "Mormon Church.,,131 
731 
Regardless of their structure, churches uniformly utilize numerous corporations 
and trusts to accomplish their various missions.132 For instance, the Roman Catholic 
Church in the United States does not technically exist as a single entity but rather as 
"a conglomeration ... of distinct taxable entities united in religious faith, worship 
and authority but not in civil law identity or control.,,133 Accordingly, in implementing 
this exception with respect to various American churches, the IRS had to determine 
which entities comprised the "church" and which merely constituted church-related 
entities not covered by the statutory exception. 134 
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (1969 Act) eliminated the church exception 
to the unrelated business income tax,135 the distinction between churches and religious 
organizations was incorporated into newly enacted code provisions. The 1969 Act 
added the notice requirement of § 508 to the Code, requiring newly created nonprofit 
131 Id. at 903-04; see Hoff, supra note 128, at 83 (noting that under a congregational struc-
ture, church property is owned in trust by a group of lay trustees, whereas in a hierarchical 
structure, church property is held by a bishop "as a corporation sole"). 
132 Whelan, supra note 110, at 904. 
133 /d. at 905. Although the IRS issues a "group ruling" to the United States Catholic 
Conference, which effectively pennits the IRS to deal with the Roman Catholic church as 
a single ''unit,'' the ruling does acknowledge that the church is comprised of many separate 
and distinct entities as listed and updated annually in the Official Catholic Directory. Id. at 
905 n.86. 
134 Id. at 905. Whelan further identified the classification problem raised with respect to 
"religious orders" within the Roman Catholic Church. Id.; see, e.g., De La Salle Inst. v. United 
States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961). TheIRS finally addressed the issue by regulation. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2(a)(3), T.D. 6301, 1958-2C.B. 222-23 (including a religious order 
within the meaning of "church" if the order is (i) an integral part of the church, and (ii) engaged 
in implementing the church's functions, regardless of whether it is separately incorporated). 
135 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121,83 Stat. 487, 536-37 (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 501-526). Under the Act, all § 501(a) tax-exempt organizations 
are subject to the unrelated business income tax except for federal instrumentalities. Id. 
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organizations to file an application with the IRS to be recognized as exempt from fed-
eral income tax under § 501(c)(3).i36 However, "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, 
and conventions or associations of churches" were specifically exempted from this 
new notice requirement. 137 As discussed below, Congress used the same language 
for purposes of exemption from the § 6033 annual return requirement.138 The new 
"integrated auxiliaries" language resulted from compromise negotiations between the 
Senate Finance Committee, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and American churches' 
representatives concerned about the restrictive and administratively difficult language 
utilized to except churches from the unrelated business income tax. 139 Although the 
Senate Finance Committee's report did not define the new term, it did provide some 
examples of integrated auxiliaries, including "mission societies and the church's 
religious schools, youth groups, and men's and women's organizations."I40 The 1969 
Act also broadened the exemption from the annual return requirement to include the 
"exclusively religious activities of any religious order.,,141 
Prior to its amendment in the 1969 Act, § 6033 exempted all religious organiza-
tions from the requirement to file annual information returns with the IRS.142 The 
1969 Act, however, limited this religious exception to just "churches, their integrated 
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches.,,143 In proposed regulations 
136 I.R.C. § 508(a) (2000). 
137 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101,83 Stat. 487, 494-96 (codified 
at I.R.C. § 508(c)(I)(A) (2000». 
138 See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
139 Whelan, supra note 110, at 914-15. 
140 S. REp. No. 91-552, at 52 (1969). The House conference committee report essentially 
adopted the language of this Senate report: "The integrated auxiliary organizations to which 
this applies include the church's religious school, youth group, and men's and women's clubs." 
H.R. REp. No. 91-782, at 286 (1969); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 915-16. 
141 I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). The House conference committee report explains 
that the term "exclusively religi~us activities" does not include "any educational, charitable, 
or other exempt activities which would serve as a basis of exemption under section 501 (c )(3) 
if an organization which is not a religious organization is required to report with respect to 
such activities." H.R. REP. No. 91-782, at 286 (1969); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 916. 
There is no documented IRS effort requiring religious orders to report on non-"exclusively 
religious" activities. [d. 
142 Specifically, § 6033 then provided that 
[n]o such annual return need be filed under this subsection by anyorga-
nization exempt from taxation under the provisions of section 501 (a)-(1) 
which is a religious organization described in section 501(c)(3); or ... 
(4) which is an organization described in section 501(c)(3), if such orga-
nization is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in connection with 
a religious organization described in paragraph (1). 
1.R.c. § 6033(a) (1954). 
143 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101,83 Stat. 487, 519-23; 1.R.c. 
§ 6033(a)(l) (1954). Paragraph (2) of§ 6033(a) was redesignated as paragraph (3) by the Tax 
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released in 1976, the Treasury Department defined "integrated auxiliary" as a 
§ 501(c)(3) organization whose primary purpose is "to carry out the tenets, func-
tions, and principles of faith of the church with which it is affiliated" and whose 
operations "directly promote religious activity among the members of the church."I44 
The proposed regulation provided examples similar to those espoused in the Senate 
Finance Committee report, but additionally stated that "[s]chools of a general aca-
demic or vocational nature are not considered to be integrated auxiliaries, even though 
they have a religious environment or promote the church's teaching.,,145 Consistent 
with this statement, the proposed regulations used a parochial elementary school as 
an example of an organization that was not an integrated auxiliary. The regulation 
explained that the school's primary purpose was to fulfill educational needs, even 
though it included religious services and subjects in its academic programs. Thus, the 
school failed the "purpose and function" test of the regulation. l46 American churches 
of all faiths and denominations almost unanimously rejected this test, claiming that 
it represented IRS intrusion into their religious activities. 147 
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress enacted § 501(h), which created an 
expenditure-based safe harbor for certain publicly funded charitable organiza-
tions-"public charities,,148 -with respect to their lobbying activities. 149 Pursuant 
to § 50 I (h)(5), churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and a convention or association 
of churches are ineligible to make this election. 150 Because the IRS had recently 
Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 Stat. 345 
(codified at 1.R.c. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006». 
144 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 6073 (Feb. 11, 1976). 
145 [d. 
146 [d. § 1.6033-2(g)(5), example (3); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 894-95. Because 
example (3) in the proposed regulations specifically provided that the school had a separate 
legal identity from the church, it raised the issue of whether an organization must be legally 
separate from the church (i.e., a corporation, trust, or other entity) in order to qualify as an 
integrated auxiliary. The question was, and continues to be, relevant in that many churches 
directly own and operate schools, hospitals, and other social service agencies without separate 
legal entities for such operations. See id. at 894 n.56. 
147 See Whelan, supra note 110, at 895; see also Hoff, supra note 128, at 89 n.92. 
148 An organization that meets the requirements of § 501(c)(3) is classified as either a 
"public charity" or a "private foundation." I.R.C. § 509(a)(1H3) (2000). A "public charity" 
typically receives its income from a broader segment of the general public in the form of gifts, 
contributions, or receipts from the performance of services, whereas a "private foundation" 
typically receives contributions from only a few individuals or entities. FIsHMAN & SCHWARZ, 
supra note 60, at 751. Furthermore, private foundations are subject to additional excise taxes. 
See 1.R.c. §§ 4940--4945 (2000). 
149 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1720 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
150 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101,83 Stat. 487, 519-23; 1.R.c. 
§ 501(h)(5) (2000). Section 501(h)(5) also excludes members of an "affiliated group oforga-
nizations" if one of the members is a church, an integrated auxiliary thereof, or a convention 
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released its proposed regulations on "integrated auxiliaries" under § 6033, Congress 
used the enactment of § 501 (h) and its use of that language as an opportune time to 
comment on the regulations' interpretation of the statutory tenn. lsl Specifically, the 
House Ways and Means Committee inserted the following comment into its report 
accompanying the § 501(h) legislation: 
Because proposed regulations have recently been published 
regarding the meaning of the tenn "integrated auxiliary" and 
because that tenn is used in this bill, your committee wishes to 
make it clear-in agreement with the conclusions of the proposed 
regulations-that theological seminaries, religious youth organi-
zations, and men's fellowship associations which are associated 
with churches would generally constitute integrated auxiliaries. 
Your committee also intends (in agreement with the conclusions 
in the proposed regulations) that hospitals, elementary grade 
schools, orphanages, and old-age homes are organizations which 
frequently are established without regard to church relationships 
and are to be treated for these purposes the same as corresponding 
secular charitable, etc., organizations[;] that is, such entities are 
not to be regarded as "integrated auxiliaries.,,152 
The Senate Finance Committee report did not include this language, or any other lan-
guage, explaining the meaning of "integrated auxiliaries.,,153 The House conference 
committee report followed the Senate report, explicitly adopting a "no position" stand-
point with respect to the above-quoted House report language. 154 Thus, as one legal 
scholar noted, the controversy over integrated auxiliaries ended without a victor-the 
churches failed to convince the conference committee to condemn the proposed reg-
ulations under § 6033, and the IRS failed to obtain legislative history favoring its 
restrictive regulatory definition. 155 
In 1977, the IRS issued final regulations under § 6033 that attempted to resolve 
some of the controversies surrounding the proposed regulations.156 First, to be an in-
tegrated auxiliary of a church, the final regulations required that a church-affiliated 
organization must be a separate legal entity that is tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3).157 
or association of churches. [d.; see also 1.R.e. § 4911 (0(2) (2000) for a definition of "affiliated 
group[s] of organizations." 
151 Whelan, supra note 110, at 920. 
152 H.R. REP. No. 94-1210, at 15-16 (1976); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 920. 
153 S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. 2, at 79 (1976); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 921. 
154 H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, at 533-34 (1976); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 921. 
ISS Whelan, supra note 110, at 921. 
156 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g) (1977). 
157 [d. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(i)(a); see id. at example (6). 
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Second, the final regulations disposed of the "purpose and function" test in favor of 
a new "principal activity" test: the organization's principal activity must be "exclu-
sively religious.,,158 An "exclusively religious" activity was one that would qualify 
for § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status as a religious organization if it applied for its own 
exemption. 159 Accordingly, a church-affiliated elementary school was not accorded 
an integrated auxiliary exemption under the regulations because its principal activity 
was educational rather than religious. l60 Notwithstanding this distinction, the final 
regulations explicitly excepted a church-affiliated elementary or secondary school 
from filing an annual return on another basis-the Treasury Secretary's statutorily 
granted discretionary power.161 
American churches objected to the "exclusively religious" standard in the regu-
lations, resulting in litigation.162 While that litigation was pending, Congress enacted 
§ 3121 (w) that set forth a financial support requirement for church-affiliated organiza-
tions desiring to elect out of social security coverage. 163 This legislative development 
prompted the IRS to issue Revenue Procedure 86-23, which abandoned the "exclusively 
religious" activity test in exchange for a more neutrally applied "internal support 
test."I64 This test is satisfied if the affiliated organization either (D does not offer 
158 Id. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(i)(c). 
159 See T.D. 7454,1977-1 C.B. 367 (Preamble); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(ii) 
(1977) ("An organization's principal activity will not be considered to be exclusively religious 
if that activity is educational, literary, charitable, or of another nature (other than religious) that 
would serve as a basis for exemption under section 501(c)(3)."). 
160 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(iv), example (2) (1977). 
161 See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(B) (1977); Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(1)(vii) (1977); see also 
42 Fed. Reg. 768 (Preamble). Whelan notes that the Secretary of the Treasury likely exer-
cised his discretionary power to try to "deflect a very powerful argument against the validity 
of the new regulations with respect to parochial schools" because of recent Supreme Court 
decisions characterizing such schools as "substantially religious and closely identified" with 
the churches' mission. Whelan, supra note 110, at 898 n.63. Whelan further comments that 
"[g]iven these decisions, it is unlikely that federal courts would agree with Treasury that these 
schools are not component 'parts' of the churches that operate them, even when they are sepa-
rately incorporated." [d. (citing Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U:S. 
472 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971». 
162 Hoff, supra note 128, at 92; see also Lutheran Soc. Servo of Minn. v. United States, 583 
F. Supp. 1298 (D. Minn. 1984), rev'd, 758 F.2d 1283, 1288-91 (8th Cir. 1985) (invalidating 
the portion of the regulation requiring an organization's "principal activity" to be "exclusively 
religious" in order to qualify as an integrated auxiliary as an impermissible interpretation of 
§ 6033); Tenn. Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. United States, 604F. Supp. 210,213 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1984), ajJ'd, 790 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding the validity of the regulations, but 
only upon concluding that the organization was "exclusively religious," thereby qualifying 
as an integrated auxiliary). 
163 Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2603, 98 Stat. 494, 1128 (1994) 
(codified at 1.R.c. § 3121(w)(3)(B) (2000»; see also Hoff, supra note 128, at 92. 
164 Rev. Proc. 86-23, 1986-1 C.B. 564. 
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"admissions, goods, services, or facilities for sale, other than on an incidental basis, 
to the general public,,;165 or (ii) offers admissions, goods or services for sale, other 
than on an incidental basis, to the general public and does not normally receive more 
than fifty percent of its support from a "combination of governmental sources; public 
solicitation of contributions," and receipts other than those from an unrelated trade 
or business. l66 If organizations receive a majority of their support from public and 
government sources rather than from church sources, the IRS reasoned that congres-
sional intent would compel such organizations to file annual returns, thus providing 
opportunity for public inspection. 167 The other notion underlying this support test 
is that the organization's "religious activity" is attenuated if a majority of its support 
does not come from religious sources, thereby transforming the organization into a 
"secular counterpart.,,168 This financial standard was subsequently imported into the 
final regulations under § 6033 addressing integrated auxiliaries. 169 
3. Current Treatment of Integrated Auxiliaries 
In late 1995, the IRS issued final regulations under § 6033 defining an "integrated 
auxiliary." 170 These regulations incorporate the internal support test of Revenue 
Procedure 86-23 171 and further require that the organization be a separate entity that is 
(l) a "charitable" organization described in § 501 (c )(3) (for example, a school, mission 
society, or youth group); (2) a public charity (as opposed to a private foundation); 172 
165 There's an exception for when the goods, services, or facilities are sold for a nominal 
charge or for substantially less than cost. Id. 
166 Id. 
167 T.D. 8640,1996-1 C.B. 289, 290. 
168 George J. Blaine, The Unfortunate Church-State Dispute Over the I.R. C. Section 6033 
"Exclusively Religious" Activity Test, 23 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1,41 (1988) (''Too much outside 
secular support weakens the controlling church's influence on the organization, makes the 
organization responsive to secular forces, and presumably dilutes its religious content. In 
other words, the lack of sufficient in-house church support renders the organization a secular 
counterpart."); see also Hoff, supra note 128, at 92. 
169 See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
170 T.D.8640, 1996-1 C.B. 289. 
171 Under current regulations, an organization is "internally supported" unless it both: 
(i) Offers admissions, goods, services or facilities for sale, other than 
on an incidental basis, to the general public (except goods, services, or 
facilities sold at a nominal charge or for an insubstantial portion of the 
cost); and; (ii) Normally receives more than 50 percent of its support 
from a combination of governmental sources, public solicitation of con-
tributions, and receipts from the sale of admissions, goods, performance 
of services, or furnishing of facilities in activities that are not unrelated 
trades or businesses. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(4) (as amended in 1995). 
172 See supra note 148. 
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and (3) "[a]ffiliated with a church or a convention or association of churches."173 An 
organization meets the "affiliated" requirement if it is covered by a group exemption 
letter issued to a church;'74 is operated, supervised, or controlled by that church; or 
if pertinent facts and circumstances establish such an affiliation. '7s The regulations 
provide a nonexclusive list of factors to detennine affiliation, including that (I) the 
organization's charter or bylaws reveal that it shares common religious doctrines or 
practices with a church or convention of churches, (ii) such church has the power to 
appoint, control, or remove at least one of the organization's officers or directors, 
(iii) the organization's name indicates an institutional relationship, (iv) the organiza-
tion submits financial and operational reports at least annually to the church, (v) the 
church affirms its relationship with the organization, and (vi) upon dissolution, the 
organization's assets are to be distributed to the church. 176 
As set forth in the 1977 regulations, current regulations similarly provide that 
men's and women's organizations, seminaries, mission societies, and youth groups 
need not meet the internal support test to qualify as integrated auxiliaries, provided 
that all of the other components are satisfied. '77 Similarly, elementary and secondary 
schools need not satisfy the integrated auxiliary rules to be exempt from filing annual 
returns provided they are considered "affiliated" with a church under those rules or 
are operated by a religious order. '78 Accordingly, the clear import from the various 
interpretative regulations as well as the legislative history of the different acts affecting 
and changing § 6033 is simplistic yet pertinent: an organization must have some sort 
of "substantial connection" with a particular church as a condition of being considered 
an "integrated" auxiliary.'79 
II. PRoPOSALS TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION BY RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
A. Overview of Alternative Proposals 
As previously explained, the only potential restraint on discrimination by religious 
organizations exists in the public-policy doctrine enunciated by the United States 
173 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1995). 
174 A group-exemption letter -or "gro~p ruling"-requires the church's central organization 
to report the entities and affiliates covered by its exemption annually to the IRS and to certify 
that each meets the requirements for exemption under § 501(c)(3). See CAFARDI & CHERRY, 
supra note 116, § 8.05. 
175 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(2) (as amended in 1995). 
176 [d. § 1.6033-2(h)(3); see also HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10.5. 
177 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(5) (1977). 
178 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(I)(vii) (as amended in 1995). Neither the Code nor the reg-
ulations define "religious order." Rather, under Revenue Procedure 91-20, an organization 
qualifies as a religious order based on certain attributes extracted from prior case law. Rev. 
Proc. 91-20, 1991-1 C.B. 524-25; see also HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10.6. 
179 Whelan, supra note 110, at 915 n.125. 
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Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States. ISO However, to date, only 
organizations that participated in racial discrimination, advocated civil disobedience, 
or were involved in an illegal activity have lost their tax-exempt status pursuant to 
the public-policy doctrine. lSI Despite its clear importance in combating racial dis-
crimination in education, the doctrine's main failure is its lack of a clearly-defined 
source of "established public policy."IS2 Namely, which sources of law or current 
policy should the IRS consult to determine that an established national policy exists?IS3 
Furthermore, of particular relevance, does discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or marital status, as evidenced by examples herein, violate an established 
public policy? Legal scholars differ in their conclusions. l84 Critics also routinely 
comment that the public policy doctrine places too much discretion in a regulatory 
agency,IS5 resulting in an evidentiary burden borne by the IRS to determine and prove 
that an organization's activities or policies violate a fundamental public policy.IS6 
Finally, some doubt exists as to the doctrine's applicability to churches or "other 
purely religious institutions," to which the Supreme Court alluded in its decision. ls7 
As addressed in my prior article, Professor David Brennen proposes expanding 
the applicability of civil rights laws to combat discrimination by charitable organiza-
tions, including religious organizations. ISS Although this expansion approach pos-
sesses significant potential, it nevertheless fails to address the kinds of discrimination 
illustrated in this Article. IS9 Current civil rights laws have limited application in that 
they only protect against discrimination based on race, color, national or ethnic origin, 
religion, sex, age, and disability. 190 These laws do not prohibit discrimination on the 
bases of sexual orientation or marital status 191_both of which appear to be common 
forms of discrimination currently engaged in by religious organizations. 192 Although 
180 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (finding ''unmistakable evidence" that the intentof§ 501(c)(3) 
requires the institution to serve a "public purpose and not be contrary to established public 
policy"). 
181 Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 45, at 391. 
182 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at51, 67; see also Brennen, Racial 
Discrimination, supra note 45, at 403-04,407,436-39. 
183 Mirkay, Charities and Discrimination, supra note 5, at 67. 
184 See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Martha Minow, Should Religious 
Groups Be Exemptfrom Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.c. L. REv. 781,821 (2007) ("Neither na-
tional consensus nor federal power squarely guards against sexual orientation discrimination. "). 
185 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
186 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 67; see also Hatfield, supra note 
48, at 16. 
187 See infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text. 
188 See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 169. 
189 See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text. 
190 See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 171-82; see also Minow, supra note 
184. 
191 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 82 nn.220-21. 
192 See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text; see also Mirkay, Charities & 
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Brennen acknowledged that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is "harm-
ful discriminatory behavior,,,193 his expansion proposal fails to address such behavior 
adequately. The application of civil rights laws to address discrimination is further 
muddied by the fact that religious organizations are entitled to discriminate on the 
basis of religion in their employment decisions without violating Title vn of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.194 Courts have routinely aligned with religious organizations on 
claims of sexual orientation discrimination in employment.195 Accordingly, Congress 
would need to amend current civil rights laws to expressly prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation and marital status to truly abolish the discriminatory 
activities and policies exhibited herein. The congressional intent necessary to prohibit 
these kinds of discrimination by all private actors, including charitable and religious 
organizations, is dubious at best. Therefore, a more tailored legislative response 
targeting charitable and religious organizations may prove to be more effective. 
B. Proposal-Narrowing Eligibility for Integrated Auxiliary Status to More 
Broadly Apply a Statutory Nondiscrimination Requirement 
As previously mentioned, imposing a broad-based nondiscrimin1ition requirement 
on religious organizations is difficult because of the constitutional concern of drawing 
too narrow a defInition of "religious" or "church.,,196 As proposed in my prior article, 
churches should likely be exempt from a statutory nondiscrimination requirement 
due to constitutional concerns, primarily those originating from the First Amendment's 
religion clauses. 197 While there is some constitutionally based analysis ostensibly 
supporting the imposition of a nondiscrimination requirement on churches,198 there 
are other Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns, the answers to which are 
Discrimination, supra note 5, at 48-50. Unless reported in the press or discussed in a court 
decision, the type and frequency of alleged or actual discrimination by religious organizations 
cannot be verified. 
193 Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 169. 
194 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-1(a) (2000) (''This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with 
respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular 
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, edu-
cational institution, or society of its activities."). 
195 Minow, supra note 184, at 808-10. Professor Minow astutely noted that "[a]lthough 
claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have not generated victories for 
plaintiffs suing religious organizations, neither have they done much to clarify the law." Id. 
at 808. 
196 See supra text accompanying notes 59~3. 
197 The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I; 
see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
198 See infra notes 368-72 and accompanying text. 
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not clear. 199 These concerns arise from churches' purely religious mission and pur-
pose, which is not necessarily present in the broader context of religious organizations 
whose purpose and mission may also encompass education, health, or social services. 
In applying the public policy doctrine, which is akin to a nondiscrimination require-
ment, the Supreme Court alluded to this distinction and a possible disparate outcome 
if the discriminating organization had been a church, stating that: "We deal here only 
with religious schools-not with churches or other purely religious institutions.,,2oo 
Accordingly, this Article continues the proposal set forth in my prior article to exempt 
churches from the requirement, but more narrowly define the term "church." This 
narrow definition "should reflect the [IRS] fifteen-point test, with specific emphasis 
on the criterion of an established and dynamic congregation.,,201 A church would 
only be exempt to the extent that the imposition of the discrimination requirement 
would be inconsistent with its established tenets or creed.202 However, as previously 
stated, a church's professed tenets or creed cannot be questioned and must be accepted 
as genuine, absent a clear showing otherwise, to allay any potential claims under the 
First Amendment's religion clauses.203 
The intent of the proposed nondiscrimination requirement is not to control or 
regulate the sincerely held religious beliefs of church members or those with whom 
they share their beliefs.204 Rather, it is to eliminate the use of tax-deductible dollars, 
and other benefits received by charitable and religious organizations pursuant to 
§ 501(c)(3), to support or maintain discrimination against members of society.205 
Accordingly, with respect to religious organizations, the most viable means of 
effecting this nondiscrimination proposal is to more narrowly define the statutory 
term "integrated auxiliary," thereby limiting the religious organizations functionally 
treated as churches under the Code.206 
199 See infra Part III.B. 
200 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983) (emphasis omitted). 
201 See Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 100. To implement such an 
exemption, the article provided that § 501(c)(3) could be amended to include the following 
subparagraph: "In the case of a church, as defined in section 508(c)(I)(A), this shall not apply 
to the extent that the application would not be consistent with the church's established tenets 
or creed." [d. at 100 n.325. 
202 [d. 
203 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
204 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 100. 
205 [d. at 52-53. 
206 Admittedly, this course of action does not address those activities that a church operates 
within its own legal entity; in other words, those activities not conducted in an entity separate 
from the church. Presumably, churches will still desire to operate activities in separate legal 
entities due to liability concerns, in which case a narrow definition of a church and, specifically, 
an integrated auxiliary, will subject at least some of those activities and entities to a nondiscrim-
ination restriction. But see Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 c.B. 158, where the IRS determined that 
the public policy doctrine could be used to deny or revoke the exempt status of a church that 
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In attempting to draw a narrow definition of a church and its integrated auxiliaries, 
both the invalidated "principal activity" test of the 1977 regulations and its replace-
ment, the internal support test, offer some valuable insights.207 In Lutheran Social 
Service of Minnesota v. United States, the Eighth Circuit determined that the "exclu-
sively religious" component of the principal activity test in the 1977 regulations was 
contrary to congressional intent and "inconsistent with the legislative history of sec-
tion 6033."208 In addition to a statutory construction argument, the court reasoned 
that church-affiliated youth groups and men's and women's clubs---examples of 
integrated auxiliaries provided in the Senate and Conference Committee Reports from 
the 1969 Act-were "no more 'exclusively religious'" than the plaintiff, a church-
affiliated social service agency.209 However, those committee reports also listed 
mission societies and religious schools as examples of integrated auxiliaries, both 
of which can arguably be interpreted as predominantly religious in nature and less 
secular than a social service agency.210 Therefore, the interpretation of what consti-
tutes religious activity can be very subjective. 
In substituting a less subjective internal support test for the exclusively religious 
principal activity test, the IRS borrowed from the financial support standard set forth 
in § 3121 (w), "which permits certain church-related exempt organizations to elect out 
of social security coverage. ,,211 Section 3121 (w) disallows an election for any church-
controlled organizations that offer goods, services, or facilities for sale to the general 
public and receive greater than twenty-five percent of their support from such sales 
or governmental sources, or both.212 The legislative history provides that: 
[M]any church-controlled organizations (including church-
controlled universities and religious hospitals) provide services 
to the general public which are similar in nature to those provided 
by other, secular institutions. Allowing an election in these cases 
would result in differing treatment for employees of religious and 
secular organizations performing essentially similar functions .... 
Further, where an organization sells its services to the general 
operated a racially discriminatory school within its own corporate entity because the school 
was not separately incorporated. In enacting Revenue Rule 75-231, the IRS relied on Reynolds 
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878), and subsequent Supreme Court cases that con-
cluded that, although the Free Exercise Clause bars government interference into religious 
beliefs, it does not necessarily "affect the legal consequences otherwise attending a given 
practice or action that is not inherently religious." Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158. 
207 See supra note 162. 
208 758 F.2d 1283, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1985). 
209 [d. at 1291. 
210 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
211 T.D. 8640, 1996-1 C.B. 289. 
212 I.R.C. § 3121(w)(3)(B) (2000). 
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public, concerns regarding the separation of church and state 
become less pressing.213 
To address these concerns, § 3121(w)(3) narrowly defines the eligibility of church-
controlled organizations for the exemption election based on their activities and fund-
ing sources.214 Congress concluded that these § 3121(w) rules "provide a fair, ob-
jective test for determining those organizations entitled to make an election without 
questioning the religious connection of any particular organization.,,215 
The primary issue raised with respect to the internal support test adopted in both 
Revenue Procedure 86-23 and the current regulations under § 6033 is the reason the 
IRS used a fifty percent maximum threshold for permissible non-church funding 
rather than the twenty-five percent threshold used in § 3121(w)(3). Neither the rev-
enue procedure nor the explanations under the notice of proposed rulemaking and 
final regulations offer any significant insights other than stating that the financial sup-
port requirement in the revenue procedure "is similar to, but more favorable than, the 
financial support requirement in section 3121 (W).,,216 If integrated auxiliaries are truly 
intended to have a substantial connection with a church or convention of churches, 
one possible solution to ensuring that more church-affiliated entities are subject to 
the nondiscrimination requirement is to lower the maximum threshold of non-church 
funding. For example, the regulations could be amended to permit only those organi-
zations whose funding from non-church sources does not exceed ten or twenty percent 
of their total support to be eligible for integrated auxiliary treatment. 217 At a mini-
mum, a twenty-percent threshold would inversely comport with the required percent-
age ownership of related for-profit corporations desiring to file a single, consolidated 
return.2I8 To avoid any confusion regarding applicability, such a restriction should 
be codified in § 508 or § 6033, as was done with § 3121(w), rather than governed 
solely by regulations. 
If Congress's intent in § 3121 (w) was only to grant exemption to organizations 
with closely controlled church affiliations, such reasoning should equally apply in the 
context of limiting the grant of church tax exemption benefits, including an exemption 
from a statutory nondiscrimination requirement. Furthermore, as with the § 3121 (w) 
test, reducing the amount of non-church funding for integrated auxiliary status attempts 
to "provide a fair, objective test ... without questioning the religious connection of 
213 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 1214 (Comm. Print 1984). 
214 Jd. 
215 Jd. 
216 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2,59 Fed. Reg. 64,633 (Dec. 15, 1994). 
217 See Whelan, supra note 110, at 924 n.159 (suggesting that organizations seeking to be 
integrated auxiliaries should not derive more than fifteen percent of their current operating 
budget from state or federal sources). 
218 See 1.R.c. § 1504(a)(2) (2000). 
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any particular organization.,,219 Finally, in addition to more effectively addressing 
discrimination concerns, a lower non-church-funding threshold would further accom-
plish the congressional goal of providing increased opportunity for public inspection, 
and therefore greater transparency, of even more tax-exempt organizations.220 
ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMPoSING A SECfION 50 I (c)(3) 
NONDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT ON RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
A. First Amendment, Generally21 
The imposition of a nondiscrimination requirement on § 501 (c )(3) organizations 
raises potential constitutional issues, primarily under the First Amendment.222 Particu-
lar to religious organizations, the First Amendment's two religion clauses-the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause--come into consideration, as discussed 
below.223 Nevertheless, one of the major criticisms of a nondiscrimination require-
ment is that it would violate an organization's First Amendment free speech and asso-
ciation rights, because it "would significantly affect . . . [an organization's] ability to 
advocate public or private viewpoints. ,,224 While the Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed this issue,225 it has upheld other restrictions on exempt organizations' activ-
ities as conditions to exemption under § 501(c)(3), and has dismissed claims that such 
219 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 1214 (Comm. Print 1984). 
220 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
221 Portions of the discussion in this subpart are substantially similar to a corresponding 
discussion contained in Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 88-94. 
222 The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment applies to 
state governments by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 
330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
223 See infra Part ill.B. 
224 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000); see, e.g., Erez Reuveni, On Boy 
Scouts and Anti-Discrimination Law: The Associational Rights o/Quasi-Religious Organi-
zations, 86 B.U. L. REv. 109, 113 (2006) (contending that "quasi-religious" organizations like 
the Boy Scouts deserve "greater associational protections" under the First Amendment than 
purely secular organizations); Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Walter Block, The Boy Scouts, Freedom 
0/ Association, and the Right to Discriminate: A Legal, Philosophical, and Economic Analysis, 
29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 851, 882 (2004) ("Freedom of association is a necessary condition of 
a civilized order; laws prohibiting discrimination violate this freedom and must be repealed."). 
225 David A. Brennen, Charities and the Constitution: Evaluating the Role o/Constitutional 
Principles in Determining the Scope o/Tax Law's Public Policy Limitation/or Charities, 5 
FLA. TAX REv. 779, 843 (2002); see also Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 
5, at 88-89. 
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restrictions constitute First Amendment violations.226 In discussing the interaction 
of constitutional rights and the income tax exemption, it is important to note that tax 
exemption is typically regarded as a congressional grant, not a constitutional right. 227 
One fundamental issue under First Amendment free speech analysis is whether the 
government can compel an organization to surrender its constitutional rights as a con-
dition to receiving a public benefit, such as a tax exemption.228 In Christian Echoes 
National Ministries v. United States, a religious organization challenged the revocation 
of its tax exemption due to its substantial lobbying and political campaign activities 
in violation of § 501(c)(3).229 The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Ministries' asser-
tion that the lobbying and political campaign restrictions in § 501(c)(3) constituted 
unconstitutional conditions on its free speech rights: 
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a matter of 
grace rather than right, we hold that the limitations contained in 
Section 501 (c )(3) withholding exemption from nonprofit corpora-
tions do not deprive Christian Echoes of its constitutionally guar-
anteed right of free speech. The taxpayer may engage in all such 
activities without restraint, subject, however, to withholding of 
the exemption or, in the alternative, the taxpayer may refrain from 
such activities and obtain the privilege of exemption.230 
Similar reasoning was employed by the Supreme Court in Regan v. Taxation 
With Representation ofWashington.231 Taxation With Representation of Washington 
(TWR), a nonprofit organization, applied for, and was denied, § 50 1 (c)(3) tax-exempt 
status due to its substantial lobbying activities.232 In addressing TWR's argument that 
the lobbying limitation violated its First Amendment rights,233 the Court first charac-
terized tax exemptions and the charitable contributions deduction as subsidies, analo-
gizing such benefits to cash grants to the organization.234 The Court further clarified 
226 See Brennen, supra note 225, at 843-44; infra notes 230-58 and accompanying text. 
227 See Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27,28 (1958); Christian Echoes Nat' I Ministry, Inc. 
v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,857 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). 
228 Oliver S. Thomas, The Power to Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional Arguments for 
Church Tax Exemption and the Practical Effect on Churches, 22 CUMBo L. REv. 605, 618 
(1992); see Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515-18 (1958) (holding that the State of 
California could not compel veterans to sign a loyalty oath as a condition to qualifying for 
a special property tax exemption for veterans). 
229 470 F.2d 852-53. 
230 /d. at 857. 
231 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
232 [d. at 542. 
233 [d. 
234 [d. at 544. For additional references on equating tax exemption and the charitable con-
tributions deduction with government subsidies, see sources cited supra note 41. 
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that Congress decided to more extensively subsidize nonprofit organizations' public 
welfare programs rather than their lobbying activities.235 Although it agreed with 
TWR's assertion that "the government may not deny a benefit to a person because 
he exercises a constitutional right,,,236 the Court explained that the Code did not re-
strict TWR' s ability to receive deductible contributions in support of its non-lobbying 
activities; Congress simply declined to finance lobbying activities with public funds.237 
The Court further rejected the "notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not 
fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.,,238 
Significantly, the Regan Court reminded TWR that it still qualified for a tax ex-
emption under § 501(c)(4) as a social-welfare organization, and that it could obtain 
deductible contributions for its nonlobbying activities by returning to the dual struc-
ture from which it originated239: two nonprofit corporations, one of which was tax-
exempt under § 501(c)(3) and the other of which was tax-exempt under § 501(c)(4).240 
The Court did, however, caution that the § 501(c)(3) organization should not sub-
sidize the § 501 (c)(4) entity, "otherwise, public funds might be spent on an activity 
Congress chose not to subsidize.,,241 
In his concurrence, Justice Harry Blackmun noted that "§ 501(c)(3) organizations 
retain their constitutional right to speak and to petition the Government" and agreed 
with the majority that a § 501 (c )(3) organization can preserve both its tax exemption 
and its free speech rights by utilizing an affiliated § 501 (c)(4) organization to carry 
out its lobbying pursuits.242 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun still cautioned that 
[s]hould the IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations 
exercise over the lobbying of their § 501(c)(4) affiliates, the 
First Amendment problems would be insurmountable. It hardly 
answers one person's objection to a restriction on his speech that 
another person, outside his control, may speak for him. Similarly, 
235 Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. 
236 [d. at 545. 
237 [d. at 545-46 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (involving a 
treasury regulation that forbade business deductions for lobbying expenses». 
238 /d. at 546 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring». 
239 [d. at 544. 
240 [d. The two nonprofit corporations merged to form Taxation With Representation of 
Washington./d. at 543; cf FCCv. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-400 (1984) 
(finding that because a noncommercial educational broadcasting station was unable to prac-
tically separate its political and exempt activities into distinct § 501 (c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) orga-
nizations, the federal law conditioning funding on the station's forbearance of its right to 
editorialize was an unconstitutional penalty). 
241 Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. To do so, the two entities should be "separately incorporated 
and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for 
lobbying." [d. at 545 n.6. 
242 [d. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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an attempt to prevent § 501 (c)( 4) organizations from lobbying ex-
plicitlyon behalf of their § 501(c)(3) affiliates would perpetuate 
§ 501(c)(3) organizations' inability to make known their views 
on legislation without incurring the unconstitutional penalty. Such 
restrictions would extend far beyond Congress' mere refusal to 
subsidize lobbying.243 
In other words, § 501(c)(4) arguably provides a constitutional safety hatch when 
imposing restrictions on the activities and possible constitutional rights of charitable 
organizations. 
After Regan, churches attempted to distinguish the decision on the basis that 
applying the statutory restrictions on lobbying and political campaign activities to 
religious organizations implicated additional constitutional issues.244 However, as 
evidenced in the D.C. Circuit's decision in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,245 religious 
organizations "appear to be on an equal footing with their secular counterparts" with 
respect to free speech challenges to the activity restrictions within § 501(c)(3).246 
In Branch Ministries, a tax-exempt church, conducting business as the Church at 
Pierce Creek (CPC), placed a full-page advertisement in two newspapers four days 
before the 1992 presidential election.247 The advertisements urged Christians to vote 
against the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton because of his "positions on certain 
moral issues.,,248 Each advertisement attributed co-sponsorship to CPC and solicited 
tax-deductible donations in support of its cause.249 In response, the IRS invoked a 
statutorily prescribed church-tax inquiry,250 followed by a church-tax examination.251 
Ultimately concluding that the placement of the advertisements violated the statutory 
prohibition on political campaign activity, the IRS revoked CPC's § 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt statuS.252 CPC challenged the revocation, alleging that the revocation violated 
243 /d. 
244 Thomas, supra note 228, at 625. 
245 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
246 Thomas, supra note 228, at 626. 
247 Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 139. 
248 [d. Each advertisement displayed the headline "Christians Beware" and declared that 
Clinton's stances on abortion, homosexuality, and the distribution of condoms to teenage 
students were contrary to "Biblical precepts." [d. at 140. 
249 [d. 
250 See id. Specific statutory rules govern the IRS's ability to audit churches. See I.R.C. 
§ 7611 (2000). A "church tax inquiry" may only be initiated by an appropriate IRS official 
(typically, a regional commissioner or person of higher rank within the IRS) who "reasonably 
believes, on the basis of facts and circumstances recorded in writing, that the organization may 
not qualify for tax exemption as a church" because of certain nonexempt activities. HOPKINS, 
supra note 48, § 26.6(c); see also I.R.C. § 7611(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). 
251 See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140; see also 1.R.e. § 7611(h)(3). 
2S2 Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140. 
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its free exercise and free speech rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993 and the First Amendment.253 
With respect to the free speech claim, the D.C. Circuit, relying on Regan, con-
cluded that CPC had "an alternate means of communication" through the formation 
and operation of an affiliated organization exempt under § 501(c)(4).254 The court 
explained that. while they are subject to a similar ban on political campaign activities, 
§ 501 (c)(4) organizations may form a political action committee that can participate 
in political campaigns without limitation.255 Still, the court reminded CPC that it could 
not channel its tax-deductible contributions to fund the political action committee 
because Congress chose not to subsidize such First Amendment activities. 256 
As in Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Regan, which deemed the availability 
of a § 501(c)(4) organization as an alternate means of communication to be "essential 
to the constitutionality of § 501 (c )(3)' s restrictions on lobbying,,,257 Branch Ministries 
relied on this availability to sustain the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)'s prohibition 
on political campaign activities.258 Accordingly, it seems probable that these alternate 
means of communication might be of similar utility in sustaining the constitutionality 
of a nondiscrimination requirement in § 501 (c )(3) with respect to religious organiza-
tions. As with the lobbying and political campaign restrictions, a religious organiza-
tion would be free to discriminate in the activities conducted within a § 501(c)(4) 
affiliate without jeopardizing its tax benefits as to its nondiscriminatory activities. 
Professor Eugene Volokh, a constitutional law scholar, comprehensively addressed 
whether the government may limit its "subsidies"--direct grants, tax exemptions and 
deductions, and access to government property-to organizations or groups that do 
not discriminate on a wide variety ofbases.259 He acknowledged that discrimination 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, or sexual orientation may often be a con-
stitutional right, as the Supreme Court concluded in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.260 
253 [d. at 140-41. See infra notes 306-10 and accompanying text for a discussion on CPC's 
free exercise claim. 
254 See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 143 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation 
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1983». 
255 [d. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(f) to (g) (1980». The court reminded CPC that the 
"related § 501 (c)( 4) organization must be separately incorporated; and it must maintain records 
that will demonstrate that tax-deductible contributions to the Church have not been used to 
support the political activities conducted by the § 501(c)(4) organization's political action 
arm." [d. 
256 [d. at 143-44 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548). 
257 [d. at 143 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring». 
258 [d. 
259 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 
58 STAN. L. REv. 1919, 1920 (2006). Professor Volokh preliminarily concludes that federal 
and state tax exemptions, including the charitable contributions deduction, are ''tantamount 
to a matching grant." [d. at 1920 n.1; see also supra note 41. 
260 Volokh, supra note 259 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) 
(holding that New Jersey's public-accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination on 
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Nevertheless, he opined that the government may have a completely plausible reason 
for imposing a nondiscrimination condition on subsidy eligibility; namely, "the com-
monly held view that discrimination is generally wrong and thus generally should not 
be subsidized by the government.,,261 
Similar to the reasoning espoused in Christian Echoes and Regan, Volokh cen-
tered his First Amendment analysis on his "No Duty to Subsidize Principle," which 
provides that the government is not constitutionally required to fund the exercise of 
constitutionally-granted freedoms and rights.262 However, his principle will govern, 
provided that it does not constitute governmental viewpoint or religious discrimina-
tion.263 In other words, the government may not differentiate among speakers based 
on their viewpoint or exclude religious conduct from governmental subsidies when 
it funds "equivalent secular conduct.,,264 
With respect to governmental viewpoint discrimination, Volokh provided the 
following example: 
Excluding the Boy Scouts and all other discriminating groups 
from a government charitable fund drive is content-neutral and 
generally permissible. Excluding only the Scouts, but not other 
groups that equally violate the antidiscrimination policy, may 
show that the government is acting because of the viewpoint the 
Scouts express and not because of the discriminatory actions that 
the Scouts take.265 
In the context of governmental religious discrimination, Volokh acknowledged 
that a nondiscrimination requirement could affect religious organizations more than 
secular ones, because "religious groups would derive more benefit from the ability 
to discriminate based on religious ideology.,,266 However, he noted that laws that 
prohibit certain practices that are central to a religious group's rituals yield the same 
result, as illustrated in the following example: 
Peyote laws, for instance, have a more serious effect on religious 
groups that see peyote use as a sacrament than on most secular 
the basis of sexual orientation, violated the Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights-specif-
ically, the freedom of expressive association-and upholding the organization's right to exclude 
homosexuals from its membership)). 
261 Id. at 1934; see, e.g., Ian Urbina, Boy Scouts Lose Philadelphia Lease in Gay-Rights 
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at A26. 
262 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1922; see also Regan v. Taxation With Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547-49 (1983). 
263 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1922. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 1931 (citations omitted). 
266 Id. at 1937. 
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groups whose members may just want to experiment with peyote. 
Yet such a disparate impact, even when it substantially burdens 
a group's exercise of religion, does not even render unconstitu-
tional criminal prohibitions of practices. It surely wouldn't bar 
the exclusion from benefit programs of groups that engage in 
those practices. 267 
749 
Therefore, Volokh ultimately detennined that the viewpoint and religious discrimi-
nation exceptions to his "No Duty to Subsidize Principle" do not effectively prevent 
the government from instituting nondiscrimination conditions on subsidies it provides, 
such as tax exemption. 268 
B. The First Amendment's Two Religion Clauses 
The federal income tax exemption of religious organizations, including any re-
striction on that exemption, raises two additional fundamental constitutional issues,269 
both of which arise under the First Amendment's two religion clauses-the Establish-
ment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.27o The Establishment Clause essentially 
disallows "governmentally established religion,,,271 while the Free Exercise Clause 
forbids "governmental interference with religion.'0272 Supreme Court jurisprudence 
reflects the distinct separateness of these two clauses, creating a tension discussed 
ad infinitum by legal scholars.273 Specifically, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
its own dilemma in finding "a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both 
of which are cast in absolute tenns, and either of which, if expanded to a logical ex-
treme, would tend to clash with each other.,,274 The tension also exists within each 
clause itself. For example, while clearly stating that the Establishment Clause does 
267 [d. (citations omitted). 
268 [d. at 1922-23; see also Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women 's Wrongs and the Bill 
of "Rights ": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 453, 484-85 (1992) (proposing 
the loss of tax exemption for organizations that employ gender discrimination in choosing their 
leaders); cf Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of 
Religion, 42 B.C. L. REv. 771, 796 (2001) (arguing that, by placing restrictions on religious 
organizations' exemption, "government subtly reshapes religious consciousness itself'). 
269 Gaffney, Federal Taxation, supra note 121, at 412. 
270 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
271 Kenneth C. Halcom, Taxing God, 38 MCGEORGEL. REv. 729, 745 (2007)( citing Walz 
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970». 
272 Wah, 397 U.S. at 669. 
273 See, e.g., Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Exemption of Religious Communities from 
State and Local Taxation, in REuGIOUS ORGANIZA nONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 
121, at 459,470; Halcom, supra note 271 (citing MICHAEL W. McCONNELLET AL., REuGION 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2002»; Witte, supra note 50, at 364. 
274 Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69. 
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not prohibit tax exemption for religious organizations,275 the Supreme Court has also 
ruled that a tax exemption granted only to religious organizations does violate the 
clause.276 Similarly, in the context of the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court 
has upheld the imposition of a generally applicable sales tax on religious organiza-
tions' materials, but the extent to which such imposition of tax would survive any free 
exercise challenges is subject to conjecture.277 Accordingly, the effect of these two 
religion clauses on restricting the income tax exemption of religious organizations 
pursuant to § 501(c)(3) requires further and more detailed exploration. 
1. Free Exercise Clause 
Free exercise cases typically involve a clash between a person's religious beliefs 
and a secular law.278 Traditional Free Exercise Clause analysis prohibits any 
government action that substantially burdens religious practices.279 Provided the 
claimant establishes that her conduct is compelled by a sincerely held religious 
belief and the government has burdened this conduct in some way, the burden of 
proof shifts to the government to prove that it has acted in the least burdensome way 
possible in furthering its compelling interest.28o The United States Supreme Court's 
decisions in Murdock v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette/81 and Follett v. Town of 
McCormic1C82 employed this traditional analysis.283 Both cases involved local 
municipal ordinances that imposed a flat license tax or fee on the sale of merchan-
dise within the city or town. These license taxes were imposed on Jehovah's 
Witnesses distributing religious literature.284 In both cases, the Supreme Court 
275 Id. at 664. 
276 Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989). 
277 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990); see 
also Halcom, supra note 271, at 746. 
278 HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10. 1 (a)(i). 
279 Thomas, supra note 228, at 609 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding 
an unconstitutional denial of unemployment benefits due to a member of the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church who resisted working on Saturdays in accordance with her religious beliefs); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (discussing the unconstitutionality of requiring 
Amish parents to send their grade school graduates to high school». 
280 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-07. 
281 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
282 321 U.S. 573 (1944). 
283 Murdock and Follett are typically viewed as cases implicating the free exercise of 
religion, but as some legal scholars observe, "[T]he results [in both cases] are also harmo-
nious with the requirements of the nonestablishment provision." Edward McGlynn Gaffney, 
Jr., Exemption of Religious Communities from State and Local Taxation, in REUGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS IN TIlE UNITED STATES, supra note 121, at 476. The author later opines that 
"[n]either Murdock nor Follett yielded opinions grounded in both nonestablishment and free 
exercise concerns." Id. at 477. 
284 Follett, 321 U.S. at 574; Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106. 
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found that the imposition of the tax violated the petitioners' First Amendment rights 
to freely exercise their religion.285 Although, as the dissents pointed out, the chal-
lenged license taxes were generally applicable to all persons and religiously 
neutral,286 these taxes were ultimately struck down because they constituted "prior 
restraint[s] on the free exercise of religious beliefs.,,287 
Distinguishing Murdock and F oUett in light of more recent Supreme Court cases, 
some legal scholars opine that the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause does not 
absolutely require that religious organizations be exempt from taxation.288 In fact, 
the Murdock Court cautioned that its decision did not mean that "religious groups ... 
are free from all fmancial burdens of government.,,289 Based on the Supreme Court's 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,290 a broadly applicable and religion-neutral 
tax should not raise free exercise concerns nor compel a local or state government to 
grant an exemption to any individual or organization, provided it does not constitute 
a prior restraint on religious activity.291 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Smith, 
"if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the 
object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and other-
wise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.,,292 As explained by 
one legal scholar, "Smith understood the Free Exercise Clause to provide an 'equality' 
right-a requirement of special justification for the discriminatory burdening of reli-
gious exercise-rather than a 'substantive' right-a requirement of special justification 
for any burdening ... of religious exercise.,,293 Accordingly, under Smith, the govern-
ment cannot impose a nondiscrimination condition on § 501 (c )(3) tax -exempt status 
only as to religious organizations, but it can impose and enforce such a condition as 
to all organizations seeking exemption thereunder.294 
This distinction is best exemplified by the decision in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries 
v. Board of Equalization, in which the Supreme Court unanimously determined that 
285 Follett, 321 U.S. at 573; Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112. 
286 See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 118 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("No evidence is offered to show the 
amount is oppressive .... There is no contention in any of these cases that such discrimination 
is practiced in the application of the ordinances."). 
287 Ha1com, supra note 271, at 751. 
288 [d. at750(citingJoHNE.NowAK&RONAlDD.RoTUNDA,CONSTrrUTIONALLAW§ 17.8 
(2000». However, in Wa/z, Justice Burger asserted that tax exemption "operated affirmatively 
to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 
U.S. 664,678 (1970). 
289 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112. 
290 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
291 Ha1com, supra note 271, at 750 (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & RONAlD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.8 (2000». See generally Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of 
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
292 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 878. 
293 Patrick J. Schiltz & Douglas Laycock, Employment in Religious Organizations, in 
REuGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 121, at 527,549. 
294 [d. at 549-50. 
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a California sales and use tax that was broadly applied and religiously neutral did not 
offend the Free Exercise Clause.295 More importantly, the Court stated that the Free 
Exercise Clause "does not require the State to grant appellant an exemption" from a 
generally applicable tax.296 In so stating, the Court distinguished Murdock and Follett 
on the basis that the flat-tax or license fee at issue in those cases "operate[d] as a prior 
restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs. ,,297 The Court cautioned, however, 
that "a more onerous tax rate, even if generally applicable," could raise free exercise 
concerns. 298 Although the Court did not speculate as to when a tax rate would be 
"onerous,,,299 it did note earlier in its opinion that the California tax constituted only 
a "small fraction of any retail sale.,,300 
A free exercise claim was also raised in Bob Jones University v. United States. 301 
In response to the university's argument that the public-policy doctrine violated its 
First Amendment free exercise rights, the Supreme Court affirmed that certain compel-
ling governmental interests can justify regulating certain religious conduct.302 In find-
ing that the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education 
was sufficiently compelling to overcome any First Amendment concerns, the Court 
concluded that the "[ d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact 
on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from 
observing their religious tenets. ,,303 The Court alluded to a disparate outcome if the 
claimant had been a church,304 stating that: "We deal here only with religious schools-
not with churches or other purely religious institutions; here, the governmental interest 
is in denying public support to racial discrimination in education.,,305 
In Branch Ministries, CPC raised a free exercise claim with regard to the rev-
ocation of its tax-exempt status due to prohibited political campaign activity.306 In 
response to that claim, the D.C. Circuit found that CPC failed to establish that the 
295 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.-S. at 389-90. 
296 [d. at 392. 
297 [d. at 389. 
298 [d. at 392. 
299 [d. 
300 [d. at 389; see also Halcom, supra note 271, at 751-52. 
301 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
302 [d. at 603. The Court relied, in part, on Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), 
which held that "neutrally cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of printed materials on public 
streets could be applied to prohibit children from dispensing religious literature." Bob Jones 
Univ., 461 U.S. at 603. 
303 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603-04. The Court further concluded that the government's 
interest "substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' 
exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests asserted by [the university] cannot be accommo-
dated with that compelling governmental interest, and no 'less restrictive means' are available 
to achieve the governmental interest." [d. at 604 (citations omitted). 
304 Thomas, supra note 228, at 614. 
305 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.29. 
306 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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revocation had substantially burdened its free exercise rights and the lack of a com-
pelling governmental interest justifying such a burden. 307 The court further concluded 
that CPC' s loss of its exemption for violating the political campaign prohibition did 
not constitute an unconstitutional burden on its free exercise rights. This would only 
be true, explained the court, "if the receipt of the privilege (in this case the tax exemp-
tion) is conditioned 'upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or ... denie[d] ... 
because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure 
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.' ,,308 The court con-
cluded that the revocation would only result in decreased funds to support CPC' s reli-
gious practices. However, the Supreme Court had previously determined that this 
financial burden lacked constitutional significance.309 Furthermore, the court found 
that CPC' s alleged burden was exaggerated because of the special treatment churches 
receive under the Code, thereby rendering the revocation's impact "more symbolic 
than substantial.,,310 
Accordingly, based on the above case law, provided a tax (I) does not constitute a 
prior restraint on religious activity, (ii) does not have as its primary purpose to impede 
such activity, (iii) is applied in a broad and religiously neutral manner, and (iv) does 
not impose too high of a rate, neither the taxation of, nor a restriction on an exemption 
granted to, religious organizations, should likely raise any free exercise concerns. 
However, Professor Volokh raised a perplexing dilemma with respect to free 
exercise concerns implicated by a nondiscrimination condition on government sub-
sidies-namely, the effect of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and its 
state counterparts.3ll As previously explained, the Supreme Court's 1990 decision 
in Employment Division v. Smith ostensibly ended any free exercise concerns with 
307 See id. at 142 (citing Jimmy SwaggartMinistries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 
384-85 (1990) ("[T]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial 
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a com-
pelling governmental interest justifies the burden."»; see also 42 U.S.c. § 2000bb-l(a) to (b) 
(2000), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (providing that 
the government can only substantially burden a person's exercise of religion if that burden 
is "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means 
of furthering" that interest). 
308 Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142 (quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 
391-92). 
309 [d. (quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391); see also Hernandez v. 
Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989) ("[P]etitioners' claimed exemption sterns from the con-
tention that an incrementally larger tax burden interferes with their religious activities. This 
argument knows no limitation."). 
310 Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142. The court further explained that, ifCPC did not inter-
vene in future political campaigns, it could "hold itself out as a 501(c)(3) organization and 
receive all the benefits of that status. All that will have been lost, in that event, is the advance 
assurance of deductibility in the event a donor should be audited." Id. at 142-43. 
311 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of1993, 42 U .S.c. § 2000bb-l (2000), invalidated 
in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see supra note 307. 
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respect to tax exemption.312 Smith held that "if prohibiting the exercise of religion ... 
is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."313 In 
response to the appeal of a broad coalition of religious organizations,314 the federal 
government enacted the RFRA, which was modeled after pre-Smith case law that 
granted exemptions from generally applicable laws, including subsidies, to religious 
objectors pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause.315 By providing a remedy to these 
religious objectors, the RFRA "shifted the burden of proof ... back to the govern-
ment.,,316 A number of states followed the RFRA either by enacting legislation or by 
interpreting their state constitutions to hold similarly that the "[g]overnment shall not 
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability," unless it "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government 
interest.,,317 Accordingly, under the RFRA and its progeny, organizations with discrimi-
natory policies or practices have a "constitutional right to religious accornmodation" 
permitting them to disregard a subsidy's nondiscrimination condition while continuing 
to receive the subsidy.318 
In addressing the effect of the RFRA, Volokh posed a significant issue: whether 
the government's refusal to subsidize discrimination based on religious beliefs or 
tenets constitutes a "substantial burden" on free exercise.319 For example, in Bob 
Jones University, decided prior to Smith, the Supreme Court found that although the 
revocation of tax exemption could have a "substantial impact" on private religious 
schools' operation, it "will not prevent those schools from observing their religious 
tenets.,,320 The Court further determined that the government's interest in eliminating 
racial discrimination in education "substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of 
tax benefits" placed on the university's free exercise rights. 321 Nevertheless, Volokh 
concluded that under these pre-Smith cases, and thus presently under the RFRA, an 
312 See supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text. 
313 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
314 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Full and Free Exercise of Religion, in REliGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 121, at 773,803. 
315 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1949-50. 
316 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Full and Free Exercise of Religion, in REliGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 121, at 803. 
317 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1950 & n.117 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a), (b)); see 
also Hatfield et aI., supra note 48, at 73 ("Congress made clear in its declaration of findings 
and purposes that the purpose of the law was to force the courts to utilize the compelling 
interest test in all cases in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."). 
318 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1950. 
319 [d. at 1954. Volokh also addressed the issue of when the "exercise of religion" is impli-
cated and by whom, thus triggering the statutory right to accommodation. See id. at 1951-54. 
320 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1982). 
321 [d. at 604. 
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organization which engaged in discrimination as a religious practice would likely 
continue to receive subsidies if the government did not have a compelling interest to 
"trump the religious freedom right," such as an interest in eradicating sexual orienta-
tion discrimination.322 But, as to a compelling governmental interest, Volokh flipped 
that statement on its head and asked "whether the government has a compelling in-
terest in refusing to fund the discrimination, even if it lacks a compelling interest in 
prohibiting the discrimination.,,323 Although concluding that both pre-Smith free ex-
ercise case law and the RFRA and its state progeny provide little, if any, answers,324 
he opined that an interest in not funding discrimination was likely not compelling.325 
Although Volokh initially concluded that it was difficult to determine whether a dis-
criminating organization would prevail under a RFRA-based claim, he nevertheless 
predicted that such an organization would likely not prevail if the issue of its right to 
receive government subsidies were before the Supreme Court.326 
In conclusion, Volokh asserted that an organization's loss of governmental sub-
sidies as a result of its discriminatory practices would not be a "terribly dire" con-
sequence. 327 First, such organizations can frequently obtain subsidies through the 
politically driven legislative process.328 For example, if the proposed nondiscrimina-
tion requirement set forth in this Article were imposed on tax exemption under § 
501(c)(3), the government would likely succumb to political pressure and exempt 
churches.329 Second, Volokh concluded practically that discriminating organizations 
that lose their eligibility for receiving deductible contributions "will be no worse off 
than lobbying or electioneering organizations, many of which thrive despite their 
lack of tax -exempt status. ,,330 
2. Establishment Clause 
Most people associate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause with pro-
hibiting the government from favoring one religion over another, not necessarily with 
justification for tax exemption. 331 Because religious organizations are regulated by 
the government as tax-exempt organizations, the Establishment Clause is necessarily 
322 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1956 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 
658-59 (2000)); see also DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9thCir.1979) 
('The courts have not designated homosexuals a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' classification so 
as to require more exacting scrutiny of classifications involving homosexuals."). 
323 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1963. 
324 Id. 
325 Id. at 1964. 
326 Id. at 1951,1968. 
327 Id. at 1924. 
328 /d. at 1924, 1967. 
329 Id. at 1967. 
330 Id. at 1924, 1967. 
331 Halcom, supra note 271, at 752; Thomas, supra note 228, at 627. 
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implicated,332 specifically, the "no excessive government entanglement" prong of a 
three-part test utilized by the Supreme Court in addressing establishment issues.333 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court determined that a state program that 
provided financial assistance to parochial schools for the teaching of secular subjects 
was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.334 In reaching its conclusion, 
the Court announced a three-prong test assembled from its previous Establishment 
Clause cases.335 Under Lemon, any state program or law (1) must have a secular pur-
pose; (2) its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and 
(3) it must not promote or foster an "excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.,,336 If a tax (or an exemption from tax) is broadly applicable and religiously 
neutral, as in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries,337 then the first two prongs of the Lemon 
test are generally not implicated. It is typically the third prong's prohibition on ex-
cessive entanglement between the government and religion that is likely implicated 
by any tax imposed on, or restriction on an exemption granted to, religious organiza-
tions.338 For example, in Lemon, the state's ability to "inspect and evaluate" the paro-
chial school's financial records for purposes of ascertaining religious and secular ex-
penditures created, according to the Court, "an intimate and continuing relationship 
between church and state.,,339 
In a decision handed down concurrently with Lemon, the Supreme Court iden-
tified several factors that could lead to excessive entanglement, namely, a continuing 
332 HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 1O.I(a)(ii). 
333 Id. (specifically articulating the entanglement as "sponsorship, financial support, and 
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity" (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612 (1971))). 
334 403 U.S. 602, 608-09, 613-14 (1971). 
335 Id. at 612. 
336 Id. at612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970». The Supreme 
Court's decision in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), updated the application of the 
three-part test announced in Lemon. Under Agostini, the third prong's prohibition on exces-
sive entanglement is considered, but only as it relates to the second prong's neutral effect 
requirement.Id. at 232-33. See WilliamP. Marshall, Constitutional Coherence and the Legal 
Structures of American Churches, in REUGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN TIlE UNITED STATES, 
supra note 121, at 759, 762 & n.17; see also Halcom, supra note 271, at 752-53 & n.170. 
337 493 U.S. at 389-90,392; see supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text. 
338 Halcom, supra note 271, at 752. However, with respect to the second Lemon prong, 
the breadth of the property tax exemption in Walz-"real estate owned by a wide array of 
nonprofit organizations"-was crucial to the Court's ultimately sustaining the exemption. 
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (referring to Walz); see also Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Are Tax" Benefits" for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits 
for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 805,823 (2001) (remarking on the similarities between 
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Texas Monthly and his concurrence in Walz). 
339 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621-22; see also Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Exemption of 
Religious Communities from State and Local Taxation, in REuGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN TIlE 
UNITED STAlES, supra note 121, at 502-03; Thomas, supra note 228, at 628. 
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financial relationship between government and the religious organization, annual 
financial audits of the organization, and government scrutiny of the organization's 
religious versus secular expenditures.34O However, in Lemon, the Court conceded that 
"[s]ome relationship [or entanglement] between government and religious organiza-
tions is inevitable.,,341 Accordingly, in subsequent decisions with respect to excessive 
entanglement, the Court has sanctioned generally applicable administrative and record-
keeping requirements,342 "routine regulatory interaction [such as application of neutral 
tax laws] which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine,,,343 and fire inspections 
and building and zoning regulations.344 In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Supreme 
Court upheld a state property tax exemption for churches and other secular charitable 
organizations, acknowledging that "[g]rantiog tax exemptions to churches necessarily 
operates to afford an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet 
a lesser, involvement than taxing them.,,345 Therefore, in comparing taxation of 
churches with granting them tax exemption, the Court observed that the latter results 
in less entanglement than the former.346 
However, a religious-organization-based exemption does not always yield reduced 
entanglement. In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court determined that a state tax 
exemption granted only to religious publications violated the Establishment Clause.347 
In addition to constituting a "statutory preference for the dissemination of religious 
ideas,,,348 the narrow exemption also raised excessive entanglement issues. As in his 
340 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971). Tilton involved governmental grants, 
pursuant to Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, to several church-related 
colleges for purposes of constructing buildings to be used for secular purposes. Id. at 674-75. 
The Tilton Court distinguished the case from Lemon on the basis that colleges and univer-
sities, unlike elementary and secondary schools, are subject to less "sectarian influence." Id. 
at 685-86. However, the Court did invalidate a provision of the Act that limited the religious 
prohibition on buildings funded under the Act to twenty years, concluding that the possible 
religious use after that time period advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
[d. at 683; see also Thomas, supra note 228, at 628. 
341 Tilton, 403 U.S. at 614; see also Ha1com, supra note 271, at 753. 
342 Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989); see also Jimmy Swaggart 
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990). 
343 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696-97. 
344 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. 
345 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970). 
346 [d. at 676 ("The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between 
church and state and far less than taxation of churches. "); see also Ha1com, supra note 271, 
at 753. 
347 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989). The Texas statute exempted from sales tax all "[p ]eriodicals that 
are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating 
the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of writing sacred to a religious faith." 
[d. at5 (quoting TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (1982»; see also Budlong v. Graham, 414 
F. Supp. 2d 1222 (N .D. Ga. 2006) (declaring unconstitutional a sales tax exemption available 
only to religious organizations). 
348 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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Walz concurrence, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Texas Monthly concentrated 
on the breadth of the tax exemption.349 The Court ultimately concluded that the nar-
row exemption created greater state entanglement because it required public officials 
to determine the religious message or nature of the publications sold.350 
By contrast, in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the imposition of sales and use tax did not constitute unconstitutional entanglement 
between the state of California and the Ministries, a religious organization.351 The 
organization argued that the imposition of the tax on its sale of religious materials re-
sulted in on-site inspections and prolonged on-site audits, examinations of its financial 
records, threats of criminal prosecution, and numerous administrative and judicial 
proceedings.352 Disputing the Ministries' factual assertions as to the state's entangle-
ment, the Court concluded that "even assuming that the tax imposes substantial ad-
ministrative burdens on appellant, such administrative and recordkeeping burdens 
do not rise to a constitutionally significant level. ,,353 Because of the tax's secular pur-
pose, general applicability, and failure to advance or inhibit religion, the Court con-
cluded that the Establishment Clause's "core values are not even remotely called into 
question.,,354 Finally, the Court found most significant and persuasive the lack of re-
quired state inquiry into the religious nature of the items sold due to the tax's general 
applicability.355 "From the State's point of view," stated the Court, "the critical ques-
tion is not whether the materials are religious, but whether there is a sale or a use, 
a question which involves only a secular determination.,,356 
In specifically addressing Establishment Clause concerns raised by a nondiscrimi-
nation condition under the Lemon test, Professor Volokh observed that applying such 
a condition to all organizations receiving a subsidy, including religious ones, has an 
obvious secular purpose and does not primarily inhibit a particular religion.357 Volokh 
349 [d. at 12 (majority opinion); see also Zelinsky, supra note 338. 
350 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20. 
351 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 396-97 (1990). 
352 [d. at 392. 
353 [d. at 394-95 (citing Hernandez v. Corom'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989) ("[R]outine 
regulatory interaction [such as application of neutral tax laws] which involves no inquiries into 
religious doctrine, ... no delegation of state power to a religious body ... and no 'detailed 
monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and religious bodies, ... does 
not of itself violate the nonentanglement command.")). 
354 [d. at 394. 
355 [d. at 396. 
356 [d. 
357 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1945 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 
574, 604 n.30 (1983)). In response to the University's contention that the denial of its tax-
exempt status violated the Establishment Clause because it preferred "religions whose tenets 
do not require racial discrimination over those which believe racial intermixing is forbidden," 
the Supreme Court stated that "a regulation does not violate the Establishment Clause merely 
because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' The 
IRS policy at issue here is founded on a 'neutral, secular basis,' and does not violate the 
Establishment Clause." Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (citations omitted). 
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opined that entanglement issues will likely arise in the context of enforcing anti-
discrimination laws or provisions, especially with respect to the hiring of clergy and 
other churches' leaders.358 While acknowledging the Supreme Court's decision in 
NIRB v. Catholic Bishop ojChicago, which addressed the potentially unconstitutional 
application of the National Labor Relations Act to teachers in religious schools,359 he 
recognized the trend of lower courts to permit the application of anti-discrimination 
law to such teachers.360 In such cases, he explained, the courts have determined that 
applying anti-discrimination law narrowly concentrates on particular hiring decisions, 
resulting in lesser amounts of entanglement than the broader sweep and involvement 
of labor law.361 After vacillating about the potentially excessive entanglement result-
ing from the fact-finding required as to employment decisions, Volokh ultimately 
concluded: 
[P]erhaps the antientanglement principle of the Establishment 
Clause counsels against closely scrutinizing groups' claims that 
they do not discriminate in clergy hiring and accepting groups' 
self-certification on the subject. But when they discriminate 
overtly, then the government can deny them a subsidy-along-
side any other groups that discriminate-without excessively 
entangling itself with religious decisionmaking.362 
Another legal commentator, Kenneth Halcom, uniquely approached the constitu-
tional issues raised in this Article in the context of imposing a federal income tax on 
religious organizations.363 Although he addressed the Free Exercise Clause and other 
constitutional concerns, his analysis predominantly focused on the Establishment 
Clause. Taking into account the extensive connections between the government and 
religious organizations under current federal income tax law, Halcom concluded 
that the imposition of an income tax would not necessarily involve additional en-
tanglements, but rather would significantly expand the ones that currently exist.364 
Accordingly, he concluded that an income tax would foster excessive governmental 
entanglement with religion under a Lemon analysis, thereby violating the Establishment 
358 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1946-47 (citing EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 
343,462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that churches have the "fundamental right ... to 'decide 
for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of 
faith and doctrine'" (citation omitted))). 
359 440 u.s. 490, 502 (1979). 
360 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1947. 
361 See id. (quoting Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 
328 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that labor law would "inject the Board into 'nearly everything' 
that occurs in a religious school")). 
362 [d. at 1949. 
363 See Halcom, supra note 271. 
364 [d. at 760. 
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Clause.365 The logical corollary to this conclusion, therefore, is that the Constitution 
requires religious organizations to be exempt from income tax. 366 
However, Halcom astutely noted that the Constitution does not necessarily 
require that religious organizations be granted exemption of the kind statutorily 
provided by § 501(c)(3)?67 A religious organization, therefore, need not be eligible 
to receive deductible charitable contributions or to issue tax-exempt bonds.368 By 
drawing a distinction between constitutionally required and statutorily granted 
exemptions, Halcom contended that the IRS could revoke a religious organization's 
tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) for violating one of its statutory conditions 
without implicating any constitutional issues, provided the IRS "does not seek to 
recover income taxes" from that organization pursuant to § 61.369 Therefore, 
Congress may place limitations on § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status without constitu-
tional implications provided the religious organization is not ultimately required to 
pay income taX.370 Accordingly, under his analysis, Halcom would phrase the issue 
raised in this Article not as whether a religious organization that discriminates 
should continue to be tax-exempt, but whether donors to that organization should 
continue to deduct their contributions under § 170 and whether the organization 
should continue to be eligible for tax-exempt financing under § 145.371 
C. Analysis 
In determining the constitutionality of imposing a nondiscrimination require-
ment on the tax exemption of religious organizations under § 501(c)(3), the analysis 
seems to focus primarily on the Establishment Clause. With respect to free speech 
or associational rights under the First Amendment, case law consistently supports 
the notion that tax exemption is a privilege, not a right, and that Congress can 
choose to not subsidize certain activities, such as lobbying or involvement in 
political campaigns.372 However, to date, the Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether denying or revoking an organization's tax-exempt status based on its 
discriminatory membership policy or other exclusionary practice violates that 
organization's First Amendment rights to expressive association.373 Nevertheless, 
365 Id. at 762. 
366 Id. at 766. 
367 Id. at 767. 
368 See id. at 767-68. 
369 Id. at 767. He also notes that "[flor substantially the same reasons, Congress may at any 
time repeal section 501 (c )(3) and the entire tax-exemption regime." Id. at 767 n.254. Further-
more, if an organization engages in excessive lobbying or political campaign activities, it will 
lose its "religious character and its corresponding First Amendment protection." Id. at 767. 
370 Id. at 768. 
371 Id. at 773. 
372 See supra notes 229-58 and accompanying text. 
373 See Brennen, supra note 225; Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 72. 
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the Court has sustained limitations on other First Amendment rights of charitable 
organizations as a condition to tax exemption under § 501 (C)(3),374 in part due to the 
ability of those organizations to qualify for tax exemption under § 501(c)(4) as 
social welfare organizations.375 This is the constitutional safe harbor to which 
Justice Blackmun alluded in his Regan concurrence.376 
The Free Exercise Clause also should not be implicated because the proposed 
nondiscrimination requirement would be broadly applied to all nonprofits seeking 
or maintaining tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) and would be religiously 
neutral.377 Furthermore, the nondiscrimination requirement does not constitute a 
prior restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs in that it does not attempt to 
prohibit or prevent the observance of religious beliefs, as in Murdock or Follett. 378 
Rather, it only limits the benefits conferred under § 501(c)(3) in addition to tax 
exemption-the charitable contributions deduction and the ability to issue tax-
exempt bonds. Even if the nondiscrimination requirement was asserted to be a 
substantial burden on an organization's free exercise of its religious beliefs, as in 
Branch Ministries, the revocation or denial of exemption would likely be viewed as 
a non-constitutionally significant burden,379 especially with respect to churches 
where the impact would be "more symbolic than substantial.,,38o Nevertheless, the 
RFRA and its state progeny do raise some perplexing free exercise questions, the 
answers to which can only be hypothesized currently by a preeminent constitutional 
law scholar.381 The uncertainty surrounding a RFRA-based free exercise claim 
ostensibly supports this Article's conclusion of exempting a "church"-as a nar-
rowly defined term-from the proposed nondiscrimination requirement. It will 
specifically avoid any excessive entanglement with respect to the hiring of clergy 
and other employees that implement the church's purely religious functions. 
374 For instance, the Court has upheld statutory limitations under § 501 (c )(3) on religious 
and other charitable organizations' lobbying and political campaign activities. See supra notes 
230-58 and accompanying text. 
375 See supra note 56. One could argue, however, that discriminatory policies or practices 
conflict with the regulatory definition of social welfare: 
An organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social wel-
fare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good 
and general welfare of the people of the community. An organization 
embraced within this section is one which is operated primarily for the 
purpose of bringing about civic betterments and social improvements. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-I(a)(2)(I) (as amended in 1990). 
376 See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text. 
377 See supra notes 279-311 and accompanying text. 
378 See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text. 
379 See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
380 See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
381 See Volokh, supra note 259, at 1963-64; see also Eugene Volokh, Intermediate 
Questions of Religious Exemptions-A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 595, 610-13, 630-34 (1999). 
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With respect to a nondiscrimination restriction on § 501(c)(3) exemption, the 
primary issue ostensibly involves the Establishment Clause-namely, whether such 
a restriction would constitute "excessive government entanglement with religion. ,,382 
Under current federal income tax law, "extensive connections" exist between religious 
organizations and the government via the IRS.383 These connections include (I) an 
application for recognition of exemption (except churches),384 (ii) record retention 
requirements,385 (iii) an annual information return (except churches),386 (iv) with-
holding taxes on employees,387 (v) payment of unrelated business income tax,388 and 
(vi) statutory limitations on exemption-prohibition on private inurement and political 
campaign activities and limitations on lobbying.389 Of course, the connections with 
churches are far less extensive because churches are generally only subject to with-
holding tax and unrelated business income tax requirements. 390 
Therefore, would an additional restriction limiting a religious organization's 
policies and practices increase these connections to a level that constitutes "exces-
sive entanglement," thus triggering Establishment Clause problems? According to 
Halcom, Congress may place limitations on § 501(c)(3) income tax exemption with-
out constitutional implications, provided the religious organization retains its consti-
tutionally required exemption.391 In other words, the organization is not ultimately 
required to pay income tax under § 61 even if its exemption is denied or revoked. 
Professor Volokh was less confident about a non-entanglement result in such con-
texts, ultimately concluding that caution should be exercised particularly with re-
spect to hiring clergy and that organizations' claims that they do not discriminate in 
such contexts should be accepted generally at face value.392 Once again, Volokh's 
conclusion ostensibly supports this Article's judgment to exercise caution and 
exempt a "church"-as a more narrowly defined term-from the proposed nondis-
crimination requirement. 
382 Lemonv. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971)(quotingWalzv. TaxComm'n,397 
U.S. 664, 674 (1970». 
383 Halcom, supra note 271, at 756. 
384 I.R.C. § 508 (2000). 
385 I.R.S. Announcement 94-111, 1994-37 I.R.B. 36; see also I.R.S., TAX GUIDE FOR 
CHURCHES AND REuGIOUS ORGANlZATIONS 20 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pI828 
.pdf [hereinafter TAX GUIDE]. 
386 I.R.C. § 6033. 
387 TAX GUIDE, supra note 385, at 18-19. 
388 See I.R.e. §§ 511-514. Although originally exempt, churches have been subject to the 
unrelated business income tax since the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See supra note 135 and 
accompanying text. 
389 See supra notes 76, 82-85 and accompanying text. 
390 Halcom, supra note 271, at 758. 
391 Id. at 766. 
392 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1946. 
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CONCLUSION 
With respect to the separation of church and state, contemporary legal scholars 
astutely observe the implausibility of separating church and state in modem times: 
"Church and state are not separate in the United States, and could not possibly be sep-
arate. The question is not whether the state should be permitted to affect religion, 
or religion permitted to affect the state; the question is how they should be permitted 
to affect each other.,,393 This Article addressed the latter question of how religious 
organizations, including churches, and the government should affect each other in the 
context of tax exemption and public benefit. Specifically, it proposed a broad nondis-
crimination condition on tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). A religious organi-
zation should not continue to enjoy the benefits of that tax-exempt status if it engages 
in discrimination, because it is intrinsically incompatible with its purpose and mission 
as a charitable organization. 
A nondiscrimination requirement in § 501 (c )(3) presents a more comprehensive 
solution to the problem of discriminatory policies and practices in religious organi-
zations than any expanded application of the public-policy doctrine or current civil 
rights laws. It would send a strong message that discrimination is fundamentally incon-
sistent with tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), thereby bolstering "the commonly 
held view that discrimination is generally wrong and thus generally should not be sub-
sidized by the government. ... "394 The intent of a statutorily imposed nondiscrimina-
tion condition is not to control or regulate religious beliefs, but to eliminate the use 
of tax-deductible dollars, and other benefits received by religious organizations pur-
suant to § 50 I (c )(3), to support or maintain discrimination against members of society. 
Because this Article focused on religious organizations and churches, its proposal 
creates many challenges, primarily constitutional in nature. Nevertheless, by permitting 
discriminatory organizations to qualify as tax-exempt social-welfare organizations 
under § 501(c)(4), a nondiscrimination condition on § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status 
should alleviate any First Amendment free speech or association concerns. In an 
attempt to avoid any potential Free Exercise or Establishment Clause concerns, 
churches, as a narrowly defined subset of religious organizations, should be excepted 
from the nondiscrimination requirement. The definition of a church, however, should 
be confined to the IRS fifteen-point tese95 with a particular emphasis on the criterion 
of an established and dynamic congregation. In addition, Congress should likewise 
narrow a religious organization's eligibility for "integrated auxiliary" status, thereby 
393 Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy 
Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 519 (2007) (quoting CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, REuGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 6-7 
(2006». 
394 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1934. 
395 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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limiting the organizations functionally treated as churches under the Code. By 
statutorily limiting an integrated auxiliary's non-church funding to twenty percent 
or less, Congress would be providing "a fair, objective test ... without questioning the 
religious nature of any particular organization.,,396 Furthennore, a lower non-church-
funding threshold would accomplish Congress's objective of subjecting more tax-
exempt organizations to public disclosure and inspection. 
Although this Article proposes some solutions, its primary intent is to further the 
dialogue on how best to resolve the inherent tension that exists when government pro-
vides tax benefits to discriminatory organizations. As one legal scholar explained, 
"We do not in the abstract resolve the tension between respecting religious groups 
and ensuring each individual protection against discrimination; nor do we resolve it 
quickly. Instead, we struggle over time, in courts, legislatures, private settings, and 
complex negotiations.,,397 Perhaps this dialogue and struggle will compel religious 
organizations to accentuate differences less and utilize the benefits of their tax-
exempt status more to further social justice and combat social ills such as poverty 
and hunger, which know no boundaries of age, gender, religion, race, ethnicity, or 
sexual orientation. 
396 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 1214 (Comm. Print 1984). 
397 Minow, supra note 184, at 848. 
